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Abstract 
Self-compassion involves showing kindness and understanding to the self during times of 
hardship. Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to exhibit lower levels of self-
compassion than the general population. The present set of studies seeks to build support for a 
domain-specific conceptualization of self-compassion, as it relates to social anxiety. Study One 
(N=160) explored self-compassionate responding in three domains of stress from self-generated 
recollections in an online format. It was predicted that individuals high in levels of social anxiety 
would be more self-compassionate in scenarios involving non-social situations (i.e., burnout, 
physical illness) than in a socially evaluative scenario. Results indicated that individuals with 
higher levels of social anxiety were least self-compassionate in the domain of social judgement, 
whereas individuals with lower levels of social anxiety were least self-compassionate in times of 
burnout. Self-compassionate responding in times of burnout was particularly low overall for the 
entire sample. This initial support for the domain specificity of self-compassion led to the 
conceptualization of Study Two (N=158). This study sought to replicate the findings of Study 
One using an in-lab paradigm and different domains of stress. Undergraduate students were 
randomly assigned to complete a challenging anagram task in the lab either alongside a group of 
other participants (social judgement condition) or alone (time-limit condition). It was 
hypothesized that individuals high in social anxiety would be less self-compassionate in the 
social judgement condition than the time-limit condition. A significant interaction effect emerged 
for the self-kindness subscale of the state self-compassion scale, however, it was in the opposite 
direction of what was hypothesized. Individuals high in social anxiety felt less self-compassion 
in the time-limit condition compared to the social judgement condition. Finally, Study Three 
(N=230), sought to replicate Study One using the same paradigm and procedure, while also 
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exploring potential mechanisms behind the differences in self-compassionate responding. Unlike 
Study One, there was no significant interaction of social anxiety by condition on state self-
compassion. However, there was a significant main effect of scenario condition which provides 
partial support for the domain-specific conceptualization of self-compassion. Those in the 
physical illness scenario were significantly more self-compassionate than those in both the social 
judgement and burnout scenarios. Self-blame, and external and personal control mediated the 
relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion. Overall, the present set of 
studies provides support for a domain-specific conceptualization of self-compassion, and partial 
support for this domain-specificity in relation to social anxiety.  
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Domain-Specific Self-Compassion in Individuals High vs. Low in Social Anxiety 
 Self-compassion can be described as caring and nurturance for the self in a non-
judgemental way (Gilbert, 2014). When individuals face hardships in their lives, it is natural to 
desire human connection to alleviate pain (Gilbert, 2015): however self-compassion can promote 
feelings of connectedness and inner peace without empathy from others. Furthermore, self-
compassion can remind individuals that trials and tribulations are part of the human condition 
(Neff, 2003a). Linked to many psychological benefits, self-compassion is an important skill for 
dealing with self-criticism, shame, guilt and issues of esteem (Gilbert 2017, Neff 2011). Yet 
many individuals fear self-compassion (Gilbert et al., 2011), and struggle to show themselves the 
gentleness they need in times of stress. This fear of self-compassion is common among 
individuals with social anxiety (Gilbert & Irons, 2004): as well, individuals with social anxiety 
are less self-compassionate than healthy controls (Werner et al., 2012). The aim of the present 
research is to explore the relationship between self-compassion and social anxiety. Specifically, 
the three studies that follow seek to show that individuals can vary in their self-compassionate 
responding across different domains of stress.  
 Self-compassion as conceptualized by Kristin Neff (2003a) is a tri-faceted construct 
linked to many positive psychological outcomes. For Neff, self-compassion is comprised of three 
distinct yet interconnected elements: (1) self-kindness – treating oneself with the warmth and 
kindness one would show a loved one rather than being harsh to the self, (2) common humanity – 
accepting one’s hardship as part of the human experience rather than feeling isolated and alone 
in one’s suffering, and (3) mindfulness – keeping thoughts and feelings in balanced awareness 
rather than dwelling on or overexaggerating them. Typically used to understand one’s failings 
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and struggles in times of stress, self-compassion has been argued to be more adaptive than self-
esteem (Neff, 2011) due to its holistic approach rather than the egocentric nature of self-esteem.  
 Self-compassion has been shown to be associated with an abundance of positive 
psychological constructs, such as happiness, optimism, wisdom, positive affect, curiosity, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Neff, Rude, & Kirkpatrick, 2007). As well, self-
compassion has been linked to lowered negative constructs like neuroticism and anxiety during 
ego threat (Neff et al., 2007; Neff, Kirkpatrick & Rude, 2007). Many areas of psychology and 
related fields have started to utilize self-compassion as both a therapeutic technique and a 
motivational instrument to improve well-being and decrease maladaptive tendencies. An 8-week 
intervention program titled Mindful Self-Compassion (MSC) was developed by Germer and Neff 
(2013) to improve self-compassion in general clinical practice. The MSC program showed 
enhancements in self-compassion, mindfulness, and well-being among adults in two randomized 
controlled trials (Neff & Germer, 2013), and improvements on depression and distress in 
individuals with Type I and Type II diabetes (Friis et al., 2016). Self-compassion training has 
also been shown to be effective for women with body dissatisfaction (Albertson et al., 2015) and 
binge eating disorder (Kelly & Carter, 2014). More relevant to the current set of studies, self-
compassion training has been shown to buffer against physiological responses related to social 
stressors, and defensiveness in response to social evaluation (Arch, Landy, & Brown, 2016; Arch 
et al., 2014).  
 Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is an anxiety disorder characterized by a debilitating fear 
of social situations, typically stemming from worry about negative evaluations from others. 
Individuals with social anxiety experience psychological and physiological distress in many 
different social situations, including but not limited to, presenting in front of an audience, 
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speaking with an authority figure, working with strangers, or even walking through a crowded 
space. When in these socially stressful situations, individuals with social anxiety may experience 
physical symptoms like excessive perspiration, blushing of the face and neck area, dizziness, 
shortness of breath, and many other uncomfortable symptoms that may make the social situation 
even more anxiety-inducing (Clark, Salkovskis, & Chalkley, 1985). As well, individuals with 
social anxiety take part in many negative psychological behaviours towards the self, including 
negative self-talk, rumination, excessive post-event processing, and pre-occupation with how one 
is coming across to others. These individuals tend to have poor expectations for how social 
situations will play out, are preoccupied with a fear of social judgment, and are highly self-
critical during the event itself. 
 Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive model of social anxiety outlines several factors that 
may prevent individuals with SAD from changing their negative beliefs about social events. Self-
focused attention is a factor that occurs once the individual enters an anxiety-provoking social 
situation. A shift in attentional focus towards the self makes individuals with SAD overly aware 
of their thoughts and behaviours, as well as any physiological changes that occur within their 
body. A second factor that occurs during a social situation is an overreliance on safety 
behaviours; techniques and behaviours used to cope with anxiety. Both of these factors lead to 
anxiety-induced performance deficits, as the individuals now lacks attention towards their 
conversational partner or audience, leading to potential missed social cues or inappropriate 
processing of others’ behaviour. Finally, anticipatory/post-event processing replays negative 
interactions or mishaps in the individual’s head both after the current event, and before future 
events. These factors create a cyclical feedback loop in which an individual with SAD holds 
negative beliefs about their abilities within a social situation, performs poorly in the situation 
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itself due to the use of excessive coping mechanisms, receives negative and confirmatory 
feedback about said abilities, and ruminates heavily on these deficits after the event.  
Clark et al. (2006) developed a cognitive therapy (CT) program specifically based on the 
cognitive model of social anxiety, to see whether this feedback loop could be broken. 
Participants meeting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) 4th 
edition criteria for social phobia (now referred to as SAD) were randomly assigned to either the 
new CT program, an exposure and applied relaxation program (EXP + AR), or a waitlist control 
group. Significant improvements on measures specific to social phobia were found for the CT 
program compared to the EXP + AR program (Clark et al., 2006). Although traditional cognitive 
therapies, such as this CT program, have yielded the most empirical support in the treatment of 
SAD (e.g., CT: Clark et al., 2006; Cognitive Behavioral Group Therapy: Heimberg & Becker, 
2002), other empirically supported therapies have also been used to treat SAD. For example, 
mindfulness and acceptance-based interventions have been gaining in popularity (Craske et al., 
2014; Kocovski et al., 2013; Kocovski et al., 2019).  The focus of these interventions is to 
provide an alternative to cognitive therapies for those who do not respond to CT or fail to 
maintain their progress from CT over longer periods of time (Craske et al., 2014). Acceptance-
based therapies use a more flexible framework, focusing on clients’ values and beliefs, and 
training them to respond in a mindful, behaviourally consistent manner (Craske et al., 2014; 
Kocovski et al., 2015). In this way, mindfulness and acceptance-based therapies relate to self-
compassion: they utilize more personal, values-based techniques of self-acceptance. An 
investigation of a mindfulness-based intervention with self-compassion training showed to be 
both feasible and acceptable for those with SAD (Koszycki et al., 2016). Individuals in the 12-
week group intervention experienced greater decreases in social anxiety symptoms and 
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depression, and increases in social adjustment compared to waitlist controls, as well as increases 
in self-compassion (Koszycki et al., 2016). These findings provide support for the idea that self-
compassion training is a helpful tool for individuals with social anxiety. Similarly, Leary et al. 
(2007) demonstrated through a series of studies that self-compassion buffered against negative 
self-feelings when imagining distressing social events. Though participants’ social anxiety levels 
were not measured or specified in this study, this does provide initial support for self-
compassion’s ability to reduce social stress in nonclinical samples as well.  
 As individuals with social anxiety are highly self-critical and have negative expectations 
for social interactions, it is not surprising that individuals with social anxiety are less self-
compassionate than healthy controls (Werner et al., 2012). In times of social stress, individuals 
with elevated levels of social anxiety are highly self-critical and judgemental of the self rather 
than kind and accepting. As well, these individuals tend to feel isolated during social interactions 
rather than part of the group, and dwell on or ruminate about failings during and after the social 
event instead of being mindful. These tendencies suggest that individuals with social anxiety are 
the opposite of self-compassionate and may benefit greatly from instruction on how to be 
compassionate to the self. Some preliminary research by Werner and colleagues (2012) found 
that self-compassion was strongly correlated with lessened fear of evaluation. Similarly, self-
compassion was found to correlate negatively with post-event processing (Blackie & Kocovski, 
2018). Therefore, self-compassion may be an effective buffer against these factors from the 
feedback loop of the cognitive model for social anxiety. 
Several studies have found positive results for inducing self-compassion in individuals 
with elevated levels of social anxiety. A study conducted by Harwood and Kocovski (2017) 
compared the self-compassionate responding of university undergraduate students high versus 
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low in social anxiety. Participants were randomly assigned to write either a self-compassion 
induction or a control condition. Participants were told that they were going to give a speech, and 
anticipatory anxiety levels were measured after the administration of either a self-compassion or 
a control induction. Interestingly, the self-compassion induction appeared to be most effective at 
reducing anticipatory anxiety for those high in social anxiety in comparison to those lower in 
social anxiety. The authors conclude that perhaps individuals who are lower in social anxiety are 
already adequately self-compassionate and therefore, the self-compassion induction does not 
affect their anticipatory anxiety, however for those high in social anxiety their lack of self-
compassion is positively altered by the induction, thus leading to reductions in anticipatory 
anxiety.  
Similarly, a study done by Arch and colleagues (2018) used socially evaluative lab tasks 
to induce stress on adult participants with and without SAD. A brief written self-compassion 
induction was then used in comparison to an active control condition to determine the feasibility 
and effectiveness of the self-compassion induction on state anxiety levels and self-compassion. 
Participants with SAD showed greater reductions in anxiety and increases in self-compassion 
after the written self-compassion induction compared to healthy controls, again indicating that 
perhaps the deficit in self-compassion held by those with SAD is what allows these self-
compassion inductions to be most effective for this population. 
Finally, a study done by Blackie and Kocovski (2018) explored the effects of a self-
compassion induction on post-event processing in undergraduate students with high levels of 
social anxiety. Participants completed an impromptu speech in-lab and were then randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions; a self-compassion written induction, a rumination condition, 
or a control condition. Post-event processing was assessed the next day, along with willingness 
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to engage in future social situations. As predicted, inducing self-compassion immediately after 
the speech task results in lessened post-event processing the next day, as well as greater 
willingness to engage in future social situations. This study indicates that not only can self-
compassion training aid individuals with social anxiety broadly, but that it can also buffer against 
specific risk factors, such as post-event processing. 
 The previous research described above has been limited to exploring the self-
compassionate responding of socially anxious individuals in times of social stress. All of the 
previous studies used social paradigms, such as a speech task to induce stress. However, no 
research to our knowledge has explored whether individuals with elevated levels of social 
anxiety show deficits in self-compassion broadly, or whether this deficit found by Werner and 
colleagues (2012) is limited to domains of social stress. The domain of social stress itself has 
been shown to be particularly detrimental for individuals both physiologically, and 
psychologically. Social evaluative stress, in chronic form, can trigger biological responses linked 
to disease and aging (Arch et al., 2014). Similarly, self-criticism tends to be most intense in 
situations where people feel critiqued and judged by others (Blatt, 1991). These findings indicate 
that the type of stress present in the domain of social stress may be inherently different from 
other domains of stress: moreover, social stress may be particularly challenging to cope with. 
Due to the judgemental nature of social stress, it may also be most challenging for individuals 
with social anxiety specifically to be self-compassionate. Whether individuals with social anxiety 
respond self-compassionately in other domains of stress is currently unexplored.  
 Many psychological constructs affected by stress and hardship have been shown to be 
domain specific; self-esteem, self-efficacy, risk-taking behaviour, self-theory, life satisfaction, 
and more (Gentile et al., 2009; Lent, Brown & Gore, 1997; Nicholson et al., 2005, Zanobini & 
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Usai, 2010; Daig et al., 2009). For example, an individual who scores highly on a measure of 
general self-esteem may score very differently in a domain that they are not competent in; 
likewise, an individual who is generally low in self-compassion may be extremely self-
compassionate when dealing with the loss of a loved one. Being able to measure psychological 
constructs in many different domains is important, as it captures nuances in behaviour or 
thoughts rather than creating broad generalizations about an individual’s capability. As such, a 
domain specific scale to measure social self-compassion was constructed (Rose & Kocovski, in 
press). The Social Self-Compassion Scale was predictive of social anxiety, perceived social self-
efficacy, and mattering beyond levels of general self-compassion. These differences suggest that 
self-compassionate responding may depend on context or domain. However, it is first important 
to establish whether self-compassion is domain-specific by determining whether individuals are 
more (or less) self-compassionate in certain domains of stress than others.  
 Some types of stressful life events may elicit more need for self-compassion than others. 
When an individual is sick, for example, they may practice more self-care and treat themselves 
with compassion. However, when an individual is stressed about work, or feels burnt out from 
taking on too many tasks at once, they may fail to be self-compassionate. Individual differences, 
such as social anxiety, may moderate this potential for differing levels of self-compassion across 
domains. Previous research within the self-compassion literature has explored self-
compassionate responding within many individual domains of stress, including bereavement, 
work burnout, chronic pain, and others (Vara & Thimm, 2019; Dev, Fernando, & Consedine, 
2020; Edwards et al., 2019). However, to our knowledge no past research has compared self-
compassionate responding across different domains, within the realm of social anxiety. 
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Therefore, the present set of studies seeks to examine how self-compassion may differ across 
multiple domains of stress, when taking into account one’s level of social anxiety. 
Study One 
The primary focus of the present study was to explore whether self-compassion is domain 
specific, and whether social anxiety moderates these potential domain differences. That is, are 
individuals more (or less) self-compassionate in certain domains of stress compared to others, 
and how does one’s level of social anxiety predict self-compassion within differing domains. For 
example, an individual with social anxiety may fail to be self-compassionate in a social 
judgement scenario yet be kind and caring to the self outside of domains of social pressure. The 
present study explored this by recruiting individuals both high and low in social anxiety, and 
randomly assigning them to recall a stressful time from one of three domains: social judgment, 
physical illness, and burnout. Consistent with past research, it was expected that those high in 
social anxiety would report lower levels of self-compassion compared to those low in social 
anxiety. However, it was hypothesized that the deficit in self-compassion for those high in social 
anxiety would be especially pronounced for the social judgement domain. A social anxiety by 
stress condition interaction was expected such that individuals high in social anxiety would 
report lower levels of state self-compassion for the social judgement condition compared to the 
physical illness and burnout conditions, and compared to individuals low in social anxiety. The 
physical illness and burnout domains were chosen because they appear to contain little to no 
elements of social judgement or social pressure to the average individual. As well, these two 
conditions are contextually different from one another and represent distinct types of hardship 
that an average individual would face in their lifetime. The social judgement domain was 
selected to explore our hypothesis that individuals with higher levels of social anxiety would be 
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less self-compassionate in the domain of social stress in comparison to the other domains of 
stress, and compared to those low in social anxiety. We had no explicit hypotheses about how 
self-compassion would differ across these three selected domains when social anxiety was not 
considered. Instead, the hypotheses focused specifically on how the interaction of one’s social 
anxiety level and the domain of stress would relate to self-compassion levels.  
Method 
Participants 
 The participants were 211 undergraduate students from Wilfrid Laurier University 
recruited through the psychology research experience program (PREP). Participants completed 
the study for partial course credit and were selected for either high or low levels of social anxiety 
based on their scores from the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN, Connor et al. 2000) and the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke 1998). Based on previously determined cut-
offs for these scales (SIAS: Cody & Teachman 2010; Mattick & Clarke 1998; SPIN: Connor et 
al. 2000; Moser et al. 2008), participants were classified as high social anxiety if they scored 30 
or greater on the SPIN and scored 34 or greater on the SIAS. Participants were classified as low 
social anxiety if their score on the SPIN was less than or equal to 10, or less than or equal to 19 
on the SIAS. Though participants were pre-selected for high or low levels of social anxiety based 
on scores from a pre-selection questionnaire they completed at the time of testing, 51 participants 
no longer met criteria for high or low social anxiety and were excluded from analyses. Of the 
remaining 160 participants, 93 were classified as high social anxiety and 67 were classified as 
low social anxiety. The remaining sample was 76.8% female, with 2 individuals identifying their 
gender as Other. The sample was predominantly White/Caucasian (73.8%), with 11.9% 
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participants identifying as Asian, 4.8% Middle Eastern/West Asian, 1.8% First Nations, 1.2% 
Black/African Canadian, and 6.5% identifying as Other. 
Measures 
 Baseline measures. The baseline measures of self-esteem, depression, and level of 
distress were operationalized using reliable single-item measures. The Single Item Self-Esteem 
Scale (SISE) was designed as an alternative to using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. This one-
item measure of global self-esteem has strong convergent validity with the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale, as well as predictive validity similar to the Rosenberg (Robins et al., 2001). 
Participants answer the single item on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not very true of 
me) to 5 (very true of me). For assessing depression, the Single Item Depression measure 
developed by Lefevre and colleagues (2012) was used. Participants rated their agreement with 
the statement “During the past week, I felt depressed” on a scale from (0) rarely to (3) most of 
the time. Finally, on two separate occasions throughout the survey, the Subjective Units of 
Distress Scale (SUDS) was used to measure participants’ levels of distress both at baseline and 
after the manipulation of scenario. The SUDS was created in 1969 by Joseph Wolpe and has 
been used to assess global self-reports of emotional and physical distress (Tanner, 2012). The 
scale asks participants to indicate their current level of distress on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, 
with markers placed every 25 points for referencing. Due to an error in programing, participants 
were only able to indicate their current distress as either 0 (not at all), 1 (corresponding to 25% 
distressed), 2 (50% distress), 3 (75% distress) or 4 (the highest level of distress, 100%).  
Trait self-compassion was also assessed at baseline using the Self-Compassion Scale 
(Neff 2003b).  The scale consists of 26 items assessing the three areas of self-compassion; self-
kindness (i.e., “I try to be loving towards myself when I’m feeling emotional pain”), common 
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humanity (i.e., “When things are going badly for me, I see the difficulties as part of life that 
everyone goes through”), and mindfulness (i.e., “When something upsets me I try to keep my 
emotions in balance”). As well, each area of self-compassion is represented by an equal number 
of reverse-coded items to assess the inverse of each area; self-judgement rather than self-
kindness, isolation rather than common humanity, and over-identified rather than mindfulness. 
The Self-Compassion Scale has displayed strong convergent validity, discriminant/divergent 
validity, and test-retest reliability (Neff, 2003b).  
 Social anxiety measures. Two previously validated measures of social anxiety were used 
at baseline; the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al. 2000) and the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke 1998).  The SPIN is a 17-item measure that assesses 
social anxiety in three areas: fear (i.e., “I am afraid of people in authority”), avoidance (i.e.”I 
avoid talking to people I don’t know”), and physiological arousal (i.e, ”I am bothered by 
blushing in front of people”). The SPIN has been shown to have good test-retest reliability and 
validity (Connor et al. 2000). The SIAS is a 20-item measure assessing how individuals respond 
in certain social situations (i.e. “When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable”).The SIAS has been 
shown to be particularly reliable for undergraduate students (α = .99) as well as people with SAD 
(α = .93) (Mattick & Clarke 1998). 
 Manipulation writing task. The writing task for the scenario manipulation was 
generated in lab and has been used in previous studies to assess self-compassion in socially 
stressful situations (Blackie & Kocovski, 2018). We decided to prompt participants to recall 
personal situations for the scenario they were randomly assigned to generate authentic feelings 
about the situation and genuine responses to subsequent questions about the scenario. All three 
scenarios required participants to answer six open-ended questions about a scenario they brought 
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to mind. Each scenario asked participants to describe the event, state when it occurred, where it 
occurred, and what they were worried about in the situation. In the social judgement scenario, 
participants were also asked who they were with, and what their relationship was to the person or 
people who were judging them. In the physical illness condition, participants were also asked 
why they thought they got sick and how they felt, both physically and emotionally. Finally, in 
the burnout situation, participants were asked who they were with and why they experienced this 
burnout. Follow-up questions after the manipulation of scenario included; “How well were you 
able to remember the situation?”, “How well were you able to remember the thoughts you had 
following the situation?”, “How anxious were you during the situation?”, “Did you feel like you 
had control over the situation?”, and “How important was the situation to you?”.  
State Self-compassion measure. The Self-Compassion Scale developed by Neff (2003b) 
was adapted to assess state levels of self-compassion as our primary dependent variable. All 26 
items were altered slightly to reflect a past-tense phrasing about the scenario they recalled as part 
of the manipulation. The adapted state version of the Self-Compassion Scale had strong internal 
consistency in the present study (α=.93). Each subscale also had good internal consistency; self-
kindness (=88), common humanity (=.78), and mindfulness (=.80). 
Post-manipulation measures. Additional measures included the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory – State Version (STAI-S), the Post-Event Processing Inventory – State Version 
(PEPI-S), and the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS). The Spielberger State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is one of the most frequently used measures of anxiety in applied 
psychology research. It is a reliable and sensitive measure of anxiety and contains two forms – 
trait and state. The state version of the STAI contains 20 items rated on a Likert scale from 1(not 
at all) to 4(very much so) and has been shown to have reliable psychometric properties in many 
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populations and languages (Spielberger et al., 1983 and Kaplan and Smith, 1995). The PEPI is a 
12-item scale created in 2017 as an alternative to previous post-event processing scales that were 
situation-specific. The PEPI contains both a trait and state version, and preliminary evidence for 
the convergent, concurrent, discriminant/divergent, incremental, and predictive validity for each 
version of the scale has been found. As well, both forms of the scale demonstrate excellent 
internal consistency (Blackie & Kocovski, 2017). The PEPI-S state version was used for this 
study. Finally, the PANAS contains 20 characterizing affects, of which participants rate their 
current feelings of this characteristic on a scale from 1(very slightly/not at all) to 5(extremely). 
The PANAS was found to be high in internal consistency and to be stable at appropriate levels 
over a two-month time period (Watson & Clark, 1988).  
Procedure 
 Participants completed the study entirely online and gave informed consent before 
continuing through the study measures. First, participants responded to some basic demographic 
questions, as well as baseline measures for social anxiety, trait self-compassion, self-esteem, 
depression, and current level of distress. Next, participants engaged in the manipulation, which 
was a writing task about one of three possible scenarios. Participants were randomly assigned to 
write about their own experience in only one of the possible scenarios. The scenarios were to 
recall (1) a time when the participant felt socially judged, (2) a time when they were physically 
ill, (3) or a time when they were stressed or burnt out. Participants were then asked some basic 
follow-up questions about the scenario they just recounted, to gauge how invested they were in 
their scenario, and level of distress was assessed again. Then participants answered questions 
from the state self-compassion scale, reflecting how they felt in regard to the scenario they just 
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brought to mind for the manipulation. Finally, state anxiety, state post-event processing, and 
mood were assessed before a brief mood-boosting activity and the debriefing statement.  
Data Analysis 
 Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were first conducted on all baseline 
measures, using both social anxiety level and condition as the independent variables. Where 
significant main effects of condition (three conditions) or an interaction effect emerged, Tukey’s 
Honestly Significant Difference test was used to examine which conditions differed significantly 
from one another, or what the simple main effects of the interaction were. Next, univariate 
ANOVAs were conducted on all post-manipulation measures, once again using social anxiety 
level and condition as independent variables.   
Results 
Baseline Measures 
Participants’ social anxiety, self-esteem, depression, levels of subjective distress, and trait 
self-compassion were compared across conditions to examine whether there were baseline 
differences (see Table 1). No significant differences were found across conditions for any of 
these baseline variables. As expected, there were significant differences between the high social 
anxiety group and low social anxiety group on all baseline variables. On both the SPIN and 
SIAS, individuals high in social anxiety reported significantly higher levels of social anxiety than 
those low in social anxiety, F(1, 155)=738.03, p<.001 and F(1,151)=658.63, p<.001. As well, 
individuals high in social anxiety indicated significantly lower self-esteem, F(1, 155)=100.91, 
p<.001, higher depression, F(1, 156)=45.05, p<.001 and greater subjective distress, F(1, 
156)=21.04, p<.001, compared to participants low in social anxiety. Individuals high in social  
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Table 1 
Study One Baseline Measures  
 High Social Anxiety      Low Social Anxiety      
 Social 
Judgement 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  Social 
Judgement 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
SPIN 41.39 8.36 42.48 8.45 40.17 8.20 9.50 5.67 8.62 4.85 10.14 5.37 
SIAS 45.51 9.90 46.24 9.73 45.78 9.27 11.55 4.67 12.70 5.30 11.74 3.97 
SCS-T 64.27 16.48 59.29 16.96 65.47 13.08 81.94 15.82 79.99 18.52 81.20 17.88 
SUDS 3.29 1.04 2.72 1.03 3.06 .86 2.21 1.02 2.12 .95 2.56 1.04 
SISE 3.10 1.38 2.97 1.40 3.11 1.37 5.13 1.54 5.21 1.06 5.33 1.09 
Depression 2.68 0.95 2.69 1.00 2.72 0.97 1.58 0.72 1.67 0.92 1.89 0.76 
Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory, SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SUDS = Subjective 
Units of Distress, SISE = Single-Item Self-Esteem scale.  
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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anxiety were also significantly less self-compassionate than individuals low in social anxiety, 
F(1, 143) = 40.48, p <.001. 
Questions about Scenario  
In examining the five follow-up questions participants were asked after the manipulation 
of scenario, some interesting differences emerged (see Table 2). There was a significant 
difference in how well participants were able to remember the situation, F(2,63)=6.77, p=.002. 
Participants asked to recall the social judgement situations were able to remember significantly 
less than participants in the physical illness and burnout situations. As well, there was a 
significant difference in how well participants were able to recall thoughts they had after the 
scenario, F(2,63)=5.83, p=.005, such that individuals in the social judgement condition were 
significantly less able to recall thoughts from after the scenario compared to those in the physical 
illness and burnout conditions. A significant interaction of scenario and anxiety level also 
emerged for this variable, F(2,156)=4.36, p=.014: individuals low in social anxiety were 
significantly less able to recall thoughts about the social judgement scenario than the burnout 
scenario, p=.004. For anxiety induced during the situation, a main effect emerged: participants in 
the burnout condition also experienced significantly higher levels of anxiety than the social 
judgement or physical illness conditions, F(2,63)=5.64, p=.006. A significant interaction of 
scenario and anxiety level (F(2,156)=6.01, p=.003 indicated that those low in social anxiety felt 
significantly less anxious in both the social judgement and physical illness scenarios than the 
burnout scenario, p=.005 and p=.047 respectively, and for those high in social anxiety, they felt 
significantly less anxious in the physical illness condition compared to both the social judgement 
and burnout scenarios, p=.011 and p=.020 respectively. Finally, participants in the physical 
illness scenario felt they had significantly less control over the situation compared to those in the  
 18 
Table 2 
Study One Questions about the Scenario 
 High Social Anxiety      Low Social Anxiety      
 Social 
Judgement 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  Social 
Judgement 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. How well were you able to remember the situation?             
 3.94 0.89 4.03 0.87 4.08 0.94 3.58 0.83 4.29 0.86 4.50 0.92 
2.How well were you able to recall the thoughts you had following the situation?             
 4.00 0.89 3.93 0.96 3.78 1.12 3.58a 0.83 4.17 0.92 4.50b 0.92 
3.How anxious were you during the situation?             
 4.45a 0.72 3.83b 0.97 4.39a 0.77 2.79c 1.22 3.13c 1.36 4.06d 1.06 
4.Did you feel like you had control over the situation?             
 2.23 1.06 2.18 1.31 2.50 1.11 2.75 1.03 2.04 1.00 2.72 0.96 
5.How important was the situation to you?             
 3.58 1.06 3.07 1.16 3.89 0.95 2.88 1.22 3.25 1.07 3.56 1.42 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at p< .05. 
  
 19 
social judgement and burnout scenarios, F(2,63)=3.70, p=.030. There was no difference across 
scenarios or by social anxiety level in the level of importance of the situation participants 
recalled.  
State Self-Compassion  
Considering our primary hypotheses on self-compassion levels, a univariate analysis of 
variance was conducted to examine whether state self-compassion levels differed both across 
conditions, and across anxiety level. Figure 1 presents these findings. For state self-compassion, 
which was measured after the random assignment to scenario, both condition and anxiety level 
were significant, as well as the interaction between anxiety level and condition, F(2,147)=3.99, 
p=.020. For condition, individuals in the physical illness condition were significantly more self-
compassionate than those in the burnout condition, p=.01. For anxiety level, individuals high in 
social anxiety were significantly less self-compassionate than those low in social anxiety, 
F(1,147)=42.62, p<.001. Finally, when breaking down the significant interaction between 
anxiety level and scenario condition on state self-compassion, F(2,147)=4.62, p=.011, it appears 
that individuals who are high in social anxiety were significantly less self-compassionate in the 
social judgement situation compared to the physical illness situation, p=.040. Differentially, 
individuals low in social anxiety were significantly less self-compassionate in the burnout 
situation in comparison to both the physical illness (p = .020), and social judgement (p = .038), 
situations. 
Next, the three subscales of the state self-compassion scale were examined. There were 
significant main effects of social anxiety for self-kindness, F(1,155)=31.72, p<.001, common 
humanity, F(1,153)=29.67, p<.001 and mindfulness, F(1,152)=48.63, p<.001. For all subscales 
the pattern was such that those high in social anxiety showed lower self-compassion than those  
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Figure 1 
Study One State Self-Compassion Results by Scenario and Anxiety Level 
 
 
 
low in social anxiety. There was a significant main effect of condition for the self-kindness 
subscale only, F(2,155)=7.88, p=.001, with those in the physical illness condition reporting 
significantly more self-compassion than those in the burnout condition (p<.001) and the social 
judgement condition (p=.001). There was not a significant main effect of condition for the 
common humanity and mindfulness subscales, F(2,153)=1.89, p=.154 and F(2,152)=1.17, 
p=.314 respectively. Finally, there was a significant social anxiety by condition interaction for 
the self-kindness and mindfulness subscales, F(2,155)=5.26, p=.006 and F(2,152)=3.86, p=.023 
respectively, whereas the interaction effect only approached significance for the common 
humanity subscale, F(2,153)=2.87, p=.060. For the self-kindness subscale, those low in social 
anxiety felt significantly less self-compassion in the burnout condition compared to the social 
judgement (p=.009) and physical illness (p=.002) conditions whereas those high in social anxiety 
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felt significantly less self-compassion in the social judgement condition compared to the physical 
illness condition (p=.023) but not the burnout condition (p=.504). For the mindfulness subscale, 
the interaction effect emerged from those high in social anxiety feeling less self-compassion in 
the social judgement condition compared to the physical illness condition (p=.084) only. 
Secondary Post-Manipulation Measures 
Finally, our follow-up variables of state anxiety, post-event processing, subjective 
distress and positive and negative affect were analyzed. Table 3 presents the means for all post-
manipulation measures, including state self-compassion described previously. There was a 
significant effect of scenario, anxiety, and interaction of scenario and anxiety on state anxiety 
levels. Not surprisingly, individuals high in social anxiety were significantly more anxious than 
those low in social anxiety, F(1, 153)=16.77, p<.001. For scenario, individuals in the burnout 
condition were significantly more anxious than the other two conditions, F(2,153)=5.07, p=.007. 
Finally, when breaking down the significant interaction, F(2,153)=4.61, p=.011, it appears that 
there were significant differences in state anxiety levels between those high versus low in social 
anxiety in the social judgement and physical illness conditions, but not in the burnout condition. 
In the burnout condition, regardless of social anxiety level, everyone reported higher feelings of 
state anxiety. Only the level of social anxiety had a significant difference on post-event 
processing, F(1,153)=53.07, p<.001. Individuals high in social anxiety engaged in significantly 
more post-event processing than those low in social anxiety. No significant differences emerged 
across conditions on SUDS scores after the manipulation of scenario. However, those high in 
social anxiety reported significantly greater subjective distress after the manipulation than those 
low in social anxiety, similar to what was found for subjective distress before the manipulation. 
As for the PANAS, there was no significant effect of condition or interaction between anxiety  
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Table 3  
Study One Post-Manipulation Measures 
 High Social Anxiety      Low Social Anxiety      
 Social 
Judgement 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  Social 
Judgment 
 Physical 
Illness 
 Burnout  
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
SCS-S  62.59a 16.51 73.14b 16.49 69.24 15.13 90.67c 17.54 91.85c 14.88 76.75d 18.42 
STAI-S  61.11 9.82 59.10 10.91 60.95 9.78 48.08a 11.98 51.41b 10.04 60.56c 7.74 
SUDS 3.84 .90 3.10 1.01 3.44 1.03 2.42 .97 2.71 1.20 3.22 1.00 
PEPI-S 41.02 8.54 35.71 11.21 34.79 8.68 25.92 10.56 23.80 8.84 28.67 8.15 
PANAS 
Positive 
21.10 6.82 20.40 8.21 22.58 8.71 25.42 8.32 25.13 7.85 23.71 7.74 
PANAS 
Negative 
25.27 10.79 20.93 7.89 23.31 9.06 13.30 2.82 14.46 6.50 17.56 7.20 
Note. SCS-S = Self-Compassion Scale-State, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress, STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State 
version, PEPI-S = Post-Event Processing Inventory-State version, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at p< .05. 
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and condition but there was a significant main effect of anxiety level for both positive and 
negative affect. Individuals high in social anxiety reported significantly less positive affect, 
F(1,154)=6.83, p=.010, and significantly more negative affect than those low in social anxiety, 
F(1,153)=38.02, p<.001.  
Discussion 
 The primary purpose of this study was to examine and provide support for the 
conceptualization of domain-specific self-compassion. It was hypothesized that individuals may 
be more self-compassionate in certain domains of stress than others, and this may vary based on 
the individual’s level of social anxiety. It was hypothesized that an individual who is high in 
social anxiety may be particularly low in self-compassion during times of social stress in 
comparison to other domains of stress. Our findings provide initial support for this hypothesis. 
Individuals who had elevated levels of social anxiety were significantly less self-compassionate 
when recalling a time when they felt socially judged in comparison to recalling a time when they 
were sick. Unexpectedly, but also in support of this domain-specific conceptualization, 
individuals low in social anxiety were significantly less self-compassionate in times of burnout 
than in times of social stress or physical illness. Overall, participants in this study displayed low 
levels of self-compassion in the burnout condition regardless of social anxiety level. This finding 
may indicate that self-compassion is particularly difficult for individuals recalling a time that 
they felt burnt out, though these individuals are capable of being self-compassionate in other 
times of need. Similarly, participants in this study displayed higher levels of self-compassion in 
recalling a time when they were physically ill, regardless of social anxiety level. Therefore, our 
results show that social anxiety level matters more in times of social judgement than in times of 
burnout or physical illness when it comes to state self-compassion. 
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 There are several implications to finding that self-compassionate responding is different 
across different domains of stress. Theoretically, this finding indicates that self-compassion is 
not just a dispositional trait that remains stable over time, but that it can differ across different 
domains of stress. From a practical perspective, individuals may learn to be more self-
compassionate in areas where self-compassion is lacking, from their responses in other domains 
of stress. This may be especially important for individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety, 
as they are lacking self-compassion in times of social stress. For these individuals, it may be 
useful to make them aware of how self-compassionate they can be in times of a physical illness 
first, and then teach them to translate those feelings of self-kindness, mindfulness, and common 
humanity into a social domain.  
One limitation to the current findings is that all scenarios were self-generated and 
recalled from a past experience. Although it is helpful to utilize personal scenarios in order to 
have the conditions feel more realistic and relatable to the participant, there is variability in the 
types of stressful situations individuals chose to recall. Specifically, within the social judgement 
condition, participants recalled distinct, conceptually different scenarios in comparison to the 
overarching similarities in scenarios recalled for the physical illness and burnout conditions. 
These differences in the type of scenario recalled for the social judgement domain may have 
important implications for our results, as some individuals may have chosen to recount more 
distressing events than others. As well, participants may have overexaggerated or underestimated 
their feelings towards the scenarios, as they were recalled from memory and not from a direct, 
same-day experience. This study asked participants to provide retrospective accounts of their 
state self-compassion rather than their current levels of self-compassion in that moment. 
Retrospective accounts of self-compassion may not capture the true feelings of self-compassion 
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in that moment. There may also be variability in how long ago the stressful situation occurred for 
each participant, which could have led to differences in the reliability of each participant’s recall. 
The potential differences in the timing of the recalled situation was not assessed in our post-
manipulation questions and is therefore a limitation. As seen by the significant differences found 
in follow-up questions after the recalled scenarios, individuals in the social stress condition were 
not able to remember the scenario and their thoughts during the scenario as well as those in the 
physical illness and burnout conditions. Therefore, Study Two was designed as an in-lab study in 
which participants receive the same type of stressful situation as other participants and must 
respond to it in the same day, so that the variability of the situation type and potential 
discrepancies in recall are removed. As well, this in-lab paradigm allows for participants to 
respond to the state self-compassion measure in the present moment rather than retrospectively. 
Study Three will include a measure of time to better examine how differences could have 
emerged based on when the event individuals recalled occurred. As well, Study Three will 
qualitatively examine the potential differences in the types of scenarios selected within each 
scenario condition. Finally, Study Three will also explore possible explanations as to why 
significant differences in self-compassionate responding emerged from the different domains of 
stress. Though there was only one single-item measure of perceived control over the situation, it 
emerged as a significant difference, in that those in the physical illness condition felt less control 
over their situation than those who recalled times of burnout or social judgement. It could be that 
those who feel more control or responsibility for the outcomes of stressful situations are less self-
compassionate. Further exploration of perceived control, and other potential mechanisms will be 
explored in Studies Two and Three. 
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Study Two 
 The purpose of this study was to replicate the findings from Study One in a more 
controlled, lab setting. Initial support for the conceptualization of domain-specific self-
compassion was found in Study One; however, variability in the types of scenarios recalled in 
each of the conditions, as well as discrepancies in recall and memory could have influenced the 
results. Therefore, Study Two utilized an in-lab paradigm to control for any potential differences 
in situational factors within conditions. As well, Study Two used a new type of domain-specific 
stress, as the stresses examined in Study One do not lend themselves to an in-lab study: 
specifically, one cannot ethically make an individual physically ill or burnt out in-lab. Therefore, 
in Study Two, a social judgement scenario was compared to a time-limit stress. Tasks were 
identical across conditions, with the exception of the number of participants present in each 
condition and the instructions used to induce the different types of stress (i.e., social judgement 
vs. time stress). It was hypothesized that participants high in levels of social anxiety would be 
less self-compassionate in the social judgement condition than in the time-limit condition. No 
differences in self-compassion across condition were expected for those low in social anxiety. 
Study Two also examined a potential mechanism for differences in individuals high and 
low in social anxiety across scenarios on self-compassionate responding: perceived control. Two 
types of control were measured in this study: perceived behavioural control, and perceived 
situational control. The former considers how in control of one’s behaviour an individual feels 
during a stressful situation (i.e., can they control shaking, nerves, etc.) (Brown, White, Forsyth, 
& Barlow, 2004), whereas the latter considers the level of control a participant feels over the 
outcome of the situation (i.e., can they do anything to change their fate) (Endler, Speer, Johnson, 
& Flett, 2001). Behavioural control measures emotional, anxiety-related reactions to stress and 
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was assessed before the in-lab stress-induction to determine a baseline level for participants’ 
perceived control. Situational control measures more external, event-based control and was 
therefore used as a state measure of perceived control over the event’s outcome after the 
manipulation occurred. As behavioural control relates directly to feeling control over symptoms 
of anxiety, we hypothesized that those high in social anxiety would have lower levels of 
behavioural control over their stress, which previous research has shown (Korte et al., 2015). For 
situational control over the event outcome itself, it was hypothesized that individuals high in 
social anxiety would feel less situational control overall, given anxiety stems from feeling a lack 
of control (Mineka & Kelly, 1989). Specifically, for individuals high in social anxiety within the 
social judgement domain, it was also hypothesized that feeling less situational control would lead 
to lower levels of self-compassion, as these individuals may feel helpless in social contexts, 
increasing their stress and decreasing their ability to be self-compassionate. In contrast, those 
low in social anxiety may feel adequate control over social situations and are therefore less 
stressed and more able to show oneself kindness. We had no predictions about situational control 
for the time-limit condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 182 undergraduate students recruited from Wilfrid Laurier University 
in exchange for partial course credit. Participants were again selected for either high or low 
levels of social anxiety based on their scores from the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN, Connor et 
al., 2000) and the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke, 1998). Participants 
were classified as high social anxiety if they scored 30 or greater on the SPIN and scored 34 or 
greater on the SIAS. Participants were classified as low social anxiety if their score on the SPIN 
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was less than or equal to 10, or less than or equal to 19 on the SIAS. Participants were double-
screened, such that their original recruitment scores from mass testing were compared to their 
scores on the SPIN and SIAS at the time of participation. This could not be done in Study One 
due to a lack of matching data, however Study Two and Study Three used the following method 
to match and retain participants. Participants were retained if their mass testing categorization 
(high vs. low in social anxiety) matched or was similar to their categorization at the time of 
participation. If participants had previously been categorized as high in social anxiety on mass 
testing and had a SPIN or SIAS score less than 10 points away from the high social anxiety cut-
off, they were retained. If participants had previously been categorized as low in social anxiety in 
mass testing and had a SPIN or SIAS score less than 10 points away from the low social anxiety 
cut-off, they were retained. Participants were excluded from analyses if their scores on the SPIN 
and SIAS greatly differed from mass testing to the time of participation (n=24). Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the social judgement condition or the time-limit condition. This 
resulted in 37 participants classified as high in social anxiety randomly assigned to the social 
judgement condition, 37 participants high in social anxiety randomly assigned to the time-limit 
condition, 46 participants low in social anxiety randomly assigned to the social judgement 
condition, and 38 participants low in social anxiety randomly assigned to the time-limit 
condition. The sample was primarily female (86.7%) with an age range of 17-32, M=18.65, SD = 
1.48). Of these participants, 66.5% identified as White, 12% identified as Middle Eastern/West 
Asian, 10.8% identified as Asian, 3.8% identified as African Canadian/Black, 0.6% identified as 
Indigenous, and 6.3% identified as another ethnicity than what was listed.  
Measures 
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 The same measures of social anxiety, state self-compassion, self-esteem, depression, 
subjective distress, state anxiety, and positive and negative affect were used from Study One. 
The trait self-compassion scale used for this study is the short-form of the self-compassion scale 
used in Study One. The Self-Compassion Scale-Short Form (SCS-SF) is a 12-item scale 
assessing the three components of self-compassion; self-kindness, common humanity, and 
mindfulness (Raes, Pommier, Neff, & Van Gucht, 2011). In two Dutch samples and one English 
sample, the SCS-SF showed a correlation to the original Self-Compassion Scale of .97 or greater, 
and adequate internal consistency (α>.86). For the state self-compassion scale, the overall 
internal consistency was once again strong, =.94, and the subscales’ internal consistencies were 
good (self-kindness =.90, common humanity =.81, mindfulness =.80). Additional measures 
not previously used are described below. 
 The Social Self-Compassion scale is an adapted version of the self-compassion scale 
short form created by Neff (2003) that reflects self-compassion in a social domain (Rose & 
Kocovski, in press). The scale consists of 12 items assessing the three areas of self-compassion 
in social settings; social self-kindness (i.e., “I try to be understanding and patient towards myself 
when I fall short of my social expectations.”), common humanity (i.e., “When I fail to do the 
right thing in a social situation, I tend to feel alone in my failure (reverse coded)”), and 
mindfulness (i.e., “When I make a mistake in public, I try to take a balanced view of the 
situation”). The purpose of using this scale in conjunction with the general self-compassion scale 
is to determine whether there are differences in self-compassion and social self-compassion in 
relation to social anxiety. 
 The Anxiety Control Questionnaire is a 30-item instrument intended to assess an 
individual's perceived level of control over anxiety related events. Developed by Rapee et al. 
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(1996), the questionnaire is rated on a 6-point Likert scale from 0-strongly disagree to 5-strongly 
agree. 18 of the items are reverse-coded. Factor analyses on this scale have indicated three 
possible components of the scale; threat control, emotion control, and stress control (Brown, 
White, Forsyth, & Barlow, 2004). Examples from the scale include, “Most events that make me 
anxious are outside my control”, “I can usually stop my anxiety from showing”, and “I will avoid 
conflict due to my inability to successfully resolve it”.  
 The anagram task contains 24 challenging anagrams or word jumbles, one of which is 
already solved as an example, and two of which are impossible to solve. Anagrams are letters of 
a word, scrambled to form non-words. The participant’s task is to unscramble the letters to form 
a real world from the English language. Some of the anagrams are more challenging than others. 
For example, “moro” spells “room” whereas “ensbusis” spells “business”.  
 The perceptions of control questions were adapted from the Event Perception measure 
designed by Conway and Terry (1992). These six items assess the extent to which participants 
felt responsible and in control of the outcome of the anagram task. Sample items include “How 
much did you feel that the outcome of the task was beyond your control?” and “How much did 
you feel that the outcome of the task would be influenced by factors external (e.g., chance) to 
yourself?” The original scale had good reliability (α=.79). 
 The manipulation check, suspicion probe, believability questions and questions about the 
researcher were all created for the purposes of this study. The manipulation check contains six 
questions rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1-not at all to 5-very much and includes questions 
such as “During the word jumbles, to what extent did you feel social pressure from people other 
than the researcher?” and “During the word jumbles, to what extent did you feel pressure from 
the time-limit?” Questions about the researcher involved four items also ranked on a 5-point 
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Likert scale, this one ranging from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree. Examples of these 
items include “I felt comfortable with the researcher” and “The researcher was cold/aloof”. The 
suspicion probe asked participants two closed-ended and two open-ended questions about 
whether their data is honest and accurate, and whether they had guesses about the purpose of the 
study. These questions are used to exclude participants who have not completed the study in an 
honest manner, or who correctly guessed the purpose of the study. Finally, the believability 
questions were constructed for a similar purpose, to ensure that participants believed the 
manipulation and therefore completed it to the best of their abilities. The believability section 
contained one closed-ended and one open-ended question about whether participants had any 
doubts about the study while completing it. 
Procedure 
The study was comprised of three sections, all completed on pen and paper in individual 
booklets. All participants completed the study entirely in-lab in one session and gave informed 
consent before starting the questionnaire booklets. Participants signed up for the study using the 
participant pool software. In the social judgement condition, participants were run in groups of 
up to six individuals. In the time-limit condition, participants were run individually. As random 
assignment to condition was not possible, given the two differing ways of running participants, 
time slots were randomly assigned in order to eliminate the possibility of certain types of 
individuals signing up at specific times of the day compared to others. A random number 
generator was used to determine when group time slots would be scheduled in comparison to 
individual time slots each week.  
Parts one and three of the booklets were identical across conditions. Participants came 
into the lab, either individually or in a group, and were given a booklet of baseline measures to 
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complete. This booklet contained basic demographic questions including age, gender and 
ethnicity, followed by trait measures of social anxiety, general self-compassion, social self-
compassion, and perceived control. After completing these measures, participants were asked to 
rate their current mood using the PANAS and fill out the single-item measures of self-esteem, 
depression, and subjective distress. Once all of these measures were completed, participants were 
asked to stop and inform the researcher that they were ready for the second part of the study. 
The second section of the study was the manipulation of stress in a specific domain. For 
those in the social judgment condition, once all participants were finished section one, they were 
each given a second booklet with the anagram task as the front page. The researcher read the 
following statement aloud for all participants at once; 
“I am going to present you with some challenging word jumbles. Your job will be to 
unscramble the letters to form a word. Word jumbles like these are often used by corporations 
and businesses in their hiring process to determine a successful candidate. Research has 
indicated that individuals who receive a score of 25 or greater on more challenging word 
jumbles like the ones you have in front of you, are more intelligent, better problem-solvers, have 
high levels of creativity, and are more competitive in job markets. Today you will attempt to 
solve all of the following word jumbles accurately. You will notice that some word jumbles are 
more challenging than others and are therefore worth more points towards your total score. You 
do not have to complete every item to get a high score. Once you have finished, please raise your 
hand to let me know. Once everyone in the group has finished or gotten as far as they can, I will 
take your sheet to mark it, and then everyone’s scores will be announced to the group to 
determine which part of the study you do next Remember, if you are stuck on one particular word 
jumble, move on. Everyone ready?” 
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Participants then worked on the anagram task for approximately 15 minutes, though no 
time limit was explicitly stated to participants. When participants finished as many as they could, 
the researcher collected the anagram sheets from each participant, labelling the sheet visibly in 
front of the participant with a number to identify them so that they felt their scores would be 
known to the researcher.  
For the time-limit performance pressure condition, the researcher read aloud the 
following statement; 
“I am going to present you with some challenging word jumbles. Your job will be to 
unscramble the letters to form a word. Word jumbles like these are often used by corporations 
and businesses in their hiring process to determine a successful candidate. Research has 
indicated that individuals who are successful in completing more challenging word jumbles like 
the ones you have in front of you, in under 7 minutes are more intelligent, better problem-
solvers, have high levels of creativity, and are more competitive in job markets. Today you will 
attempt to solve all of the following word jumbles in under 7 minutes. I am going to set a timer 
on my phone for 7 minutes and place it beside you. If you finish before the time is up, please let 
me know. If you are stuck on one particular word jumble, move on so you do not waste time. 
Once you are finished, or the time is up, move on through the rest of the booklet. Your 
performance on the word jumble task will remain confidential in your booklet, just like all of 
your survey responses. Are you ready? When I say go, the timer will start.” 
Then a timer was placed beside the participant and they began the anagram task. Once the 
timer beeped to indicate that seven minutes had passed, the researcher collected the timer and 
instructed the participant to continue through the final part of their study booklet. Their 
responses on the anagram task were never scored by the researcher and remained in their study 
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package. It is important to note that given the researcher never scored the anagram task in this 
condition, the statement that the researcher read to participants did not tell them that they had to 
achieve a specific score, as was mentioned in the social judgement condition. This aspect was 
omitted to prevent participants from having suspicions that their anagrams would in fact be 
scored even though the researcher said they would not be scored. 
 The final part of the booklet was the same for all participants. They first recorded their 
subjective level of distress after the anagram task, followed by the state self-compassion scale 
and a measure of state anxiety. Participants then completed questions on perceptions of control, a 
manipulation check, and questions about their perceptions of the researcher. As the researcher 
cannot possibly be blind to condition, this last questionnaire was put in place to ensure no 
differences emerged by condition on how friendly or cold the researcher was. Finally, 
participants were asked whether they had any suspicions about the study and how believable it 
was, followed by a mood booster task. Participants were then debriefed, including a quick 
summary of the concealment and deception that took place.  
Data Analysis 
  Similar to Study One, univariate ANOVAs were conducted first on all baseline 
measures, using social anxiety level and condition as the independent variables. Next, the 
anagram task performance and manipulation checks were analyzed, also using univariate 
ANOVAs. Post-manipulation measures, including state self-compassion and its subscales, were 
then analyzed using univariate ANOVAs with social anxiety level and condition as the 
independent variables. Where an interaction effect emerged, Tukey’s Honestly Significant 
Difference test was used to examine whether the simple effects were statistically significant. 
Finally, moderated mediation analyses were conducted with condition as the independent 
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variable, social anxiety level as the potential moderator of both the a and the ϲ’ pathways, control 
items were used as two potential mediators (run separately), and state self-compassion was 
entered as the dependent variable. Specifically, Model 8 from Andrew F. Hayes’ PROCESS 
software was used in the moderated mediation analyses. 
Results 
Baseline Measures 
 Table 4 displays the means and standard deviations for the baseline variables. For all 
baseline measures, there was a significant main effect of social anxiety, but no main effect of 
condition and no significant interaction effects. Those high in social anxiety had lower levels of 
trait self-compassion than those low in social anxiety, F(1,152)=46.26, p<.001. Similarly, those 
high in social anxiety had lower levels of trait social self-compassion than those low in social 
anxiety, F(1,154)=107.67, p<.001. For the Anxiety Control Questionnaire, which was used to 
measure perceptions of control, those high in social anxiety perceived less control over their 
anxiety than those low in social anxiety, F(1,148)=116.37, p<.001. There was a significant main 
effect of social anxiety for both PANAS subscales: those high in social anxiety reported 
significantly lower ratings on positive affect than those low in social anxiety, F(1,154)=10.70, 
p=.001, and those high in social anxiety reported significant greater negative affect ratings than 
those low in social anxiety, F(1,153)=14.76, p<.001. Finally, individuals high in social anxiety 
displayed significantly lower levels of self-esteem, F(1,154)=63.73, p<.001, greater levels of 
depression, F(1,154)=15.44, p<.001, and greater subjective distress before the anagram task was 
introduced, F(1,154)=4.65, p=.033, compared to those low in social anxiety.  
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Table 4 
Study Two Differences in Social Anxiety Across Baseline Measures  
 High Social Anxiety     Low Social Anxiety    
 Judgement  Time  Judgement  Time  
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Trait Self-Compassion 
(SF) 
29.97 6.06 29.14 6.81 36.52 8.15 38.95 8.36 
Social Self-Compassion 28.57 5.29 27.54 6.90 38.89 8.03 40.55 7.36 
ACQ 66.03 13.99 70.06 17.40 97.40 19.10 101.31 20.11 
PANAS 
Positive 
24.27 6.00 23.32 6.53 27.28 8.38 28.05 8.15 
PANAS 
Negative 
18.57 7.09 17.51 7.00 14.96 5.03 13.70 4.82 
SISE 3.19 1.31 3.14 1.46 4.78 1.49 5.05 1.21 
Depression 1.62 0.89 1.62 1.01 1.17 0.90 0.92 0.85 
SUDS 40.68 23.99 38.97 24.05 35.00 26.83 27.97 20.93 
Note. SF = Short-Form, ACQ = Anxiety Control Questionnaire, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, SISE = Single-Item 
Self-Esteem Scale, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale. Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = 
significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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Anagram Performance 
 There was a significant difference of condition on anagram task performance, 
F(1,150)=57.48, p<.001. Participants in the social judgement condition (M=10.00, SD=3.60) 
completed significantly more anagrams than participants in the time-limit condition (M=5.85, 
SD=2.95), though both groups experienced failure to complete all anagrams. There were no 
differences in anagram task performance across social anxiety groups. 
Manipulation Check 
 Five individual items were asked at the conclusion of the study to serve as a manipulation 
check. Running a correlational analysis on these five items, it was found that items one and four, 
which assessed how strongly participants felt pressure and judgement from the researcher 
respectively, were strongly correlated (r(158)=.57, p<.001). As well, items two and five which 
assessed how strongly participants felt pressure and judgement from other people, were strongly 
correlated (r(158)=.72, p<.001). It was therefore decided to combine pressure and judgement 
from the researcher, and pressure and judgement from others, into two single variables. Thus, 
results on the manipulation check were analyzed as three factors: social judgement from the 
researcher, social judgement from others, and time pressure (see Table 5).  
For social judgement felt from the researcher, there was a significant main effect of social 
anxiety, F(1,154)=6.44, p=.01, such that those high in social anxiety felt more judgement from 
the researcher than those low in social anxiety but no main effect of condition or significant 
interaction. For social judgement felt from others, there was a similar significant main effect of 
social anxiety, F(1,154)=13.23, p<.001, as well as a significant main effect of condition, 
F(1,154)=14.22, p<.001, and the interaction approached significance, F(1,154)=0.27, p=.06. As 
expected, those in the social judgement condition felt significantly more judgement from others  
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Table 5 
Study Two Manipulation Check Variables 
 High Social Anxiety     Low Social Anxiety    
 Judgement  Time  Judgement  Time  
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Social Judgement from 
Researcher 
2.07 1.08 1.85 1.05 1.48 0.75 1.71 1.24 
Social Judgement from 
Others 
2.45 1.31 1.78 1.22 1.80 1.09 1.30 0.67 
Time Pressure 3.19 1.19 4.08 0.98 2.98 1.33 4.00 1.07 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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than those in the time-limit condition. Finally, when examining time pressure, there was a 
significant main effect of condition, F(1,154)=26.63, p<.001, but not social anxiety, and there 
was no significant interaction. As expected, those in the time-limit condition felt more time 
pressure than those in the social judgement condition. Overall, these analyses provide support for 
the successful manipulation of time pressure, although the social judgement manipulation may 
not have been as effective. It is important to note that the means for social judgement (both from 
researcher and from others) were low in both conditions, and low compared to the time pressure 
means (see Table 3). The descriptors that participants viewed as they completed the manipulation 
check items ranged from (1)disagree to (5)very much agree  For the social judgement variable, 
the largest mean only approached “somewhat” agreement with the social pressure and social 
judgement items, whereas the time pressure statements had means approaching the “very much” 
agreement descriptor where relevant. Therefore, the manipulation check indicates greater success 
in inducing time-limit pressure for those in the time-limit condition, and less success inducing 
social pressure in the social judgement condition.    
Post-Manipulation Measures: Distress, Anxiety, and Task Perceptions 
 Subjective distress, state anxiety, and perceived control over the anagram task were 
compared across condition and social anxiety level using ANOVAs. Table 6 displays the means 
and standard deviations for these variables. There were significant main effects of social anxiety, 
such that those high in social anxiety were significantly more distressed and had greater levels of 
state anxiety after the anagram task compared to those low in social anxiety, F(1,154)=21.44, 
p<.001 and F(1,151)=26.57, p<.001 respectively. No significant effects of condition, or 
interaction effects, were found for these variables.  
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Table 6 
Study Two Post-Manipulation Measures on Outcome Variables 
 High Social Anxiety    Low Social Anxiety    
 Judgement  Time  Judgement  Time  
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD 
State SCS 73.14 16.27 65.31 14.66 86.37 19.11 87.00 14.04 
SCS-Self-Kindness  26.58a 7.16 21.46b 6.42 30.13 8.64 30.32 7.61 
SCS-Common Humanity  22.36 5.54 21.22 6.06 28.21 5.60 28.18 4.50 
SCS-Mindfulness  23.92 5.78 21.94 4.20 27.93 6.01 28.50 3.90 
SUDS 58.16 21.47 60.27 21.42 42.15 23.29 43.61 21.79 
STAI-S 56.78 10.91 60.81 10.69 49.09 13.12 50.05 8.91 
Task Perceptions         
Control over outcome 3.03 0.93 2.59 1.19 2.17 0.97 2.71 1.21 
Control over task 2.86a 0.95 3.14b 1.27 3.15b 1.37 2.92b 1.27 
No change 3.41 0.93 3.16 1.19 3.02a 1.27 3.58b 1.15 
Resolution steps 3.03 0.76 3.11 1.02 3.63 0.95 3.16 0.97 
External factors  2.78 1.06 2.84 1.09 2.65 1.25 2.47 1.25 
Internal factors  3.95 0.85 4.14 0.86 3.96 1.01 3.97 1.10 
Note. SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress, STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Version. 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. Means in the same row with different subscripts differ significantly at p< .05.  
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The task perception items considered the level of control participants felt over the 
anagram task and outcome. There were no significant effects for questions on internal and 
external factors influencing task performance. A significant main effect of social anxiety, 
F(1,154)=4.60, p=.034 and a significant interaction effect, F(1,154)=7.94, p=.005, emerged for 
how much participants felt that the task outcome was beyond their control. Those high in social 
anxiety felt less control, and this was particularly the case for those high in social anxiety in the 
social judgement condition. A significant interaction effect also emerged for the item assessing 
how much participants felt there was nothing they could do to change the situation, 
F(1,154)=4.88, p=.029. Those low in social anxiety felt that they had to just accept the situation 
more in the time-limit condition than in the social judgement condition. Finally, there was a 
significant main effect of social anxiety, F(1,154)=4.79, p=.030, and an interaction effect 
approaching significance, F(1,154)=3.00, p=.065 on the item “How much did you feel that you 
could take steps to resolve the task?”, where those high in social anxiety felt less able to take 
steps to resolve the task overall, and for the interaction, those low in social anxiety felt less able 
to resolve the task in the time-limit condition.  
State Self-Compassion 
 It was hypothesized that an interaction effect would emerge for state self-compassion, 
such that individuals high in social anxiety would display lower levels of self-compassion in the 
social judgement condition compared to the time limit condition, and those low in social anxiety 
would show no differences in state self-compassion across condition. However, only a main 
effect of social anxiety emerged for state self-compassion, F(1,147)=43.14, p<.001. The main 
effect of condition was not significant, F(1,147)=1.84, p=.178, and the interaction was not 
significant, F(1,147)=2.53, p=.114. Similar to what was displayed in the trait self-compassion 
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analysis, those high in social anxiety had significantly lower levels of state self-compassion after 
the anagram task than those low in social anxiety.  
The three subscales from the self-compassion scale were analyzed next. Both the 
common humanity subscale and the mindfulness subscale displayed similar patterns to the 
overall state self-compassion scale with only significant main effects of social anxiety, 
F(1,150)=52.93, p<.001 and F(1,151)=40.95, p<.001, respectively. There were no significant 
main effects of condition, F(1,150)=0.44, p=.508 and F(1,151)=0.73, p=.395 respectively. As 
well, there were no significant interaction effects, F(1,150)=0.40, p=.526 and F(1,151)=2.36, 
p=.126, respectively. However, for the self-kindness subscale there was a significant main effect 
of social anxiety, F(1,152)=25.99, p<.001, a significant main effect of condition, F(1,152)=4.12, 
p=.044, and a significant interaction effect, F(1,152)=4.76, p=.031. Individuals who were high in 
social anxiety were significantly less self-kind than those low in social anxiety, and those in the 
time-limit condition were less self-kind than participants in the social judgement condition. 
Breaking down the significant interaction, those high in social anxiety in the time-limit condition 
were significantly less self-kind than those high in social anxiety in the social judgement 
condition (p=.002), which is the opposite of what was originally hypothesized. Those low in 
social anxiety did not significantly differ on their self-kindness across conditions. Figure 2 
displays this significant interaction effect. 
 Given that there were significant differences across conditions on post-manipulation 
distress and state anxiety, the self-kindness analysis was re-run, controlling for these variables. 
This was done to determine whether the significant self-kindness effect was a result of greater 
subjective distress or greater state anxiety felt by participants in the time-limit condition. First, 
controlling for subjective distress, there was still a significant main effect of social anxiety,  
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Figure 2 
Study Two State Self-Kindness Interaction Effect 
 
 
 
 
F(1,151)=12.24, p=.001, a main effect of condition, F(1,151)=3.39, p=.049, and a significant 
interaction, F(1,151)=4.96, p=.027. Regardless of subjective distress after the anagram task, 
participants high in social anxiety, participants in the time-limit condition, and particularly those 
high in social anxiety in the time-limit condition, were less self-kind. Second, controlling for 
state anxiety, the significant main effect of social anxiety remained, F(1,148)=4.52, p=.035, the 
interaction became marginally significant, F(1,148)=3.06, p=.082, and the main effect of 
condition was no longer significant, F(1,148)=1.95, p=.165. When controlling for both 
subjective distress and state anxiety in the model, the self-kindness results remain similar to 
when controlling only for state anxiety; the main effect of social anxiety remains, F(1,147)=3.84, 
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p=.052, the interaction effect is marginally significant, F(1,147)=3.04, p=.083, and the condition 
effect is no longer significant, F(1,147)=2.06, p=.153. Both the common humanity and 
mindfulness subscales were also re-run controlling for subjective distress and state anxiety: there 
were no main effects of condition or interaction effects. 
Exploring Perceived Situational Control Mediation Models 
 Since there was only a main effect of social anxiety and no significant interaction on the 
perceived behavioural control measure pre-manipulation, no mediation analysis was explored for 
the Anxiety Control Questionnaire. However, two items from the situational perceptions of 
control measure displayed significant interaction effects and were entered into two moderated 
mediation models to see whether they mediated the effects that social anxiety level and scenario 
condition had on state self-compassion. It was expected that these items would indicate that 
those high in social anxiety experience less perceived situational control, leading to lower levels 
of self-compassion. The first item, “How much did you feel that the situation was beyond your 
control” did not mediate the relationship, as indicated by the confidence interval for the indirect 
effect (CI: -0.24 and 0.59). The second item, “How much did you feel that you had to accept the 
situation, as there was nothing you could do” also failed to mediate the relationship, as indicated 
by the confidence interval for the indirect effect (CI: -0.26 and 0.31). Next, the self-kindness 
subscale was used in the same two mediations. The first control item once again did not mediate 
the relationship between social anxiety level, condition, and state self-kindness (CI: -0.07 and 
0.39). The second control item also failed to mediate the relationship (CI: -0.10 and 0.13). 
Social Self-Compassion Scale 
 This study included both the short-form version of the self-compassion scale (Raes, 
Pommier, Neff, & Van Gucht, 2011), and the social self-compassion scale developed by Rose 
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and Kocovski (in press) at baseline. This was included to determine whether the social self-
compassion scale is a better predictor of state self-compassion for a social stressor compared to 
Neff’s scale. Table 7 displays correlations between social self-compassion and Neff’s self-
compassion scale, as well as other relevant trait and state variables. Social self-compassion was 
descriptively more strongly correlated with all of these measures than trait self-compassion. As 
well, social self-compassion was descriptively more strongly correlated with all of these 
measures in comparison to the state self-compassion measure, with the exception of state 
anxiety. 
  A hierarchical linear regression was conducted with state self-compassion as the 
dependent variable, trait self-compassion entered into step one, and trait social self-compassion 
entered into step two. At step one, trait self-compassion was a significant predictor of state self-
compassion accounting for 37% of the variance, F(1,147)=86.58, p<.001. Adding social self- 
compassion to the model in step two explained an additional 7%, and this change in R2 was 
significant F(2,146)=57.99, p<.001. 
Table 7 
Study Two Social Self-Compassion Scale Correlations 
  Social SC State SC SPIN SIAS STAI-S ACQ 
Trait SC  .84** .61** -.52** -.49** -.36**  .62** 
Social SC  - .65** -.66** -.66** -.43**  .70** 
State SC   - -.53** -.50** -.73**  .49** 
SPIN    -  .92**  .51** -.70** 
SIAS     -  .41** -.68** 
STAI-S      - -.48** 
ACQ       - 
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Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory, SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SC = Self-
Compassion, STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State version, ACQ = Anxiety Control 
Questionnaire. 
* = p<.05. ** = p<.01 
Discussion 
Overall, Study Two failed to support the hypothesis that individuals high in social anxiety 
would report lower levels of self-compassion in a social judgement condition compared to a 
time-limit condition. However, there was a significant interaction of social anxiety and condition 
on state self-kindness, one of the subscales of the state self-compassion measure. This significant 
interaction effect was in the opposite direction of what was originally hypothesized. Individuals 
high in social anxiety felt less self-kind in the time-limit condition than in the social judgement 
condition. There were no significant interactions of social anxiety and condition for the other two 
facets of self-compassion (common humanity and mindfulness). 
 
 The weak support found for the social pressure manipulation could serve as one 
explanation for these opposing findings on the self-kindness subscale. Although the time-limit 
condition appeared to be effective in inducing time pressure, the results from the social 
judgement manipulation were not as expected. The social judgement condition was expected to 
produce greater levels of social judgement compared to the time limit condition; however, mean 
levels of social judgement were low for participants in both conditions. Although participants in 
the social judgement condition did feel greater social judgement from others during the study, 
participants in both the time-limit and social judgement conditions felt similar levels of social 
judgement from the researcher. Though the researcher took a more active role in viewing the 
participants’ anagram scores in the social judgement condition, the characteristics of the time-
limit condition - sitting in a room alone with the researcher to complete the anagram task – may 
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have been more daunting than expected. This added pressure of having both a time-limit, and 
feeling some social judgement from the researcher in the time-limit condition, may explain why 
people high in social anxiety (who are most affected by social judgement) were least self-kind in 
the time-limit condition. This “double-whammy” of felt pressure may have overwhelmed these 
individuals and limited their ability to be self-kind.  
 As well, surprisingly, participants in the time-limit condition reported some level of 
social judgement felt from other people during the manipulation check. This was particularly the 
case for those high in social anxiety, and was unexpected, as there were no other people present 
for this condition. This item was meant to assess the social judgement that participants in the 
social judgement condition felt, as there were up to five other participants present during that 
condition. However, it was not expected that participants in the time-limit condition would feel 
socially judged by people other than the researcher, given that no other people were in the room. 
This finding could suggest that participants failed to correctly read or appropriately respond to 
this item, or that some underlying pressure from others took place in a broader sense for 
participants. Perhaps participants worried that their friends might ask them about how the study 
went, or that someone other than the researcher would later see and judge their performance on 
the anagram task. This misperception could have caused participants in the time-limit condition 
to experience greater feelings of social judgement than was intended by the manipulation. 
Another consideration is that the self-kindness findings were influenced by the greater 
subjective distress and state anxiety experienced by participants high in social anxiety compared 
to those low in social anxiety. It could be that those high in social anxiety felt more subjective 
distress or state levels of anxiety in the time-limit condition, resulting in excessive stress and 
lower self-kindness. However, there were no significant differences across conditions on distress 
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or anxiety, and no interaction effects were found. Further, when analyses were conducted on 
state self-kindness controlling for subjective distress after the anagram task, all significant results 
on the self-kindness subscale were retained. When controlling for state anxiety, the interaction 
effect was marginally significant. Taken together, these results support that something about the 
conditions themselves, outside of anxiety and distress, differentially affected state self-kindness 
levels for those high vs. low in social anxiety.  
 Another potential explanation for the self-kindness results being in the opposite direction 
of our expectations involves the significant difference across conditions in anagram task 
performance. Those in the social judgement condition completed significantly more anagrams 
than those in the time-limit condition. Those in the time-limit condition received only 7 minutes 
to work on the anagram task, however those in the social judgement condition received 
approximately 15 minutes to complete the task. In the social judgement condition, no mention of 
time or time limits occurred while participants were given the anagram task instructions. This 
was done to avoid eliciting time pressure in participants in the social judgement condition. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that these differences on task performance are not reflective of 
inherent differences in the random assignment of participants to condition, but rather the nature 
of the conditions themselves. Those with only 7 minutes to complete the task should presumably 
have a lower anagram completion rate than those who had more than double the amount of time 
to complete the task. This difference in task performance is important to consider, as individuals 
who had the time to complete more anagrams (in the social judgement condition) may have felt 
less negatively about themselves and the task. Participants in the time-limit condition may have 
experienced greater disappointment in themselves for not finishing as many anagrams as they 
had hoped, and though the post-anagram subjective distress rating does not capture this, these 
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individuals may have found it more challenging to be self-compassionate. As previous research 
has indicated a deficit in self-compassion for those high in social anxiety (Werner et al., 2012), 
this added disappointment from task performance may have had the greatest impact on 
individuals high in social anxiety in the time-limit condition, resulting in their lower levels of 
self-kindness.  
It is not clear why the interaction effect was limited to the self-kindness facet of self-
compassion.  Participants high in social anxiety reported lower levels of common humanity and 
mindfulness than those low in social anxiety, but there was not a significant interaction between 
social anxiety group and condition on these two facets. Some previous research on the Self-
Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003) has displayed mixed findings for results on the individual facets 
of self-compassion. For example, Blackie and Kocovski (2018) used the Self-Compassion Scale 
when exploring the relationship between post-event processing, social anxiety, and self-
compassion. They found that the common humanity subscale was not negatively correlated with 
post-event processing in individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety, whereas the self-
kindness and mindfulness subscales were. Another study examining the relationship between 
self-compassion and mental health in Korean university students found that self-kindness was a 
key predictor of positive mental health overall, whereas the other facets of self-compassion were 
only related to specific dimensions of mental health, but not overall mental health like the self-
kindness facet (Shin & Lim, 2018). The present study provides further indication that the 
subscales of self-compassion do not always perform in identical ways and may relate to some 
constructs more strongly than others. It is possible that the common humanity items did not 
relate as strongly to the distress of the anagram task and conditions utilized in the present study. 
Because the anagram task was completed individually, regardless of whether other participants 
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were present or not, one’s success on the task related directly to one’s ability. Self-criticism, 
which is considered to be the opposite of self-kindness in Neff’s conceptualization of self-
compassion (2003), may have been most relevant to the anagram task, as it reflects one’s own 
ability to solve anagrams. For example, a self-kindness item from the state self-compassion scale 
is “I was tough on myself”. Participants may have been able to respond to this item more easily 
than some of the common humanity items that do not appear to be as relevant at face-value. For 
example, “I felt separate and cut off from the rest of the world” is an item reflecting the common 
humanity facet. Participants could have felt poorly about their performance on the anagram task, 
but still felt connected to the rest of the world, so perhaps this item was not as directly relevant to 
the task. However, for the mindfulness subscale, it is unclear why participants did not respond 
similarly to the self-kindness subscale, as the mindfulness items generally seem applicable to the 
anagram task. For example, one mindfulness item “I obsessed and fixated on everything that 
went wrong in the situation” appears to relate to the potential frustration participants may have 
felt when struggling with the task.   
Although this study contained measures of perceived situational control, these items did 
not significantly mediate the relationship between social anxiety, condition, and state self-
compassion (or self-kindness). This was surprising, however looking at the overall means of the 
control items, it appears that participants were generally neutral in their feelings of perceived 
control. This neutrality may have been a reason why the mediation models did not come to 
fruition as hypothesized. Future research should continue to explore how perceived control, and 
other forms of control, relate to self-compassion.  
Finally, the social self-compassion scale (Rose & Kocovski, in press) was utilized in this 
study to further the existing literature on this scale. Correlational analyses revealed that the social 
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self-compassion scale was highly correlated with social anxiety, state anxiety, and perceived 
behavioural control. As well, the hierarchical linear regression revealed that the social self-
compassion scale provides incremental prediction of state self-compassion above and beyond 
that found from trait self-compassion alone. Since both conditions contained elements of social 
stress and pressure (unintentionally for the time-limit condition), this finding could be further 
support for the importance of a social self-compassion scale to measure self-compassion within 
the context of social stress. 
 There are several limitations to Study Two. As previously mentioned, the manipulation 
check indicates that perhaps the social judgement condition was not as reliable at inducing social 
judgement as the time-limit condition was at inducing time pressure. Having participants bring 
their answers for the word jumble to the researcher for scoring and being told that their scores 
would be read to the group may not have been a strong enough manipulation of social 
judgement. Previous research on social anxiety and self-compassion has typically used some 
form of speech task to induce social stress (Blackie & Kocovski, 2017; Arch et al., 2018). 
Therefore, future research should consider altering the social judgement condition, perhaps by 
having participants read their answers aloud to the group as a form of speech task to induce 
social judgement. However, caution should be used when utilizing a speech task, as our intent 
with the present study was to create conditions with equal amounts of stress. Using a speech task 
in the social judgement condition may overpower the stress given to participants in the time-limit 
condition, confounding the results.  
Relatedly, it is possible that the time-limit condition elicited too much social judgement 
from having the researcher present in the room while the participant completed the anagram task. 
This may have made the time-limit condition more stressful, confounding our results. Future 
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research should explore ways of reducing social judgement from the researcher in a non-social 
judgement comparison condition. A time limit was used in the present study; in future research 
utilizing other domains of stress that would not include aspects of social judgement would be 
beneficial. Another limitation is that this study did not contain a control or reference group. A 
third condition in which individuals completed the anagram in a group setting without social 
pressure, or individually with added social judgement elements could have been useful to 
reference whether the effects found stemmed from the number of participants present, or the type 
of stress involved. Finally, the significant differences in anagram task performance by condition 
are concerning, as it is possible that individuals high in social anxiety in the time-pressure 
condition were less self-kind because they felt more disappointed in their performance than those 
in the social judgement condition, who had more time to complete significantly more anagrams. 
Previous research has shown that individuals high in social anxiety are more likely to interpret 
their task performance as poor than those low in social anxiety, even when they perform 
similarly (Dannahy & Stopa, 2007). Given that the anagram task performance stems from the 
nature of the conditions themselves (the length of time allotted for participants to complete the 
task), future research should explore ways to make the amount of time given in each condition 
more equal without eliciting time pressure in the social judgement condition. Some additional 
future directions to build from this in-lab experiment could include having more individuals 
present in the social judgement condition, creating a team-building or interactive social 
judgement condition where personal anagram scores influence other participants’ scores, and 
adding additional conditions with alternate domains of stress for comparison. 
 Study One results indicate that individuals high in social anxiety are less self-
compassionate when recalling a time when they felt socially judged in comparison to other 
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domains of stress and in comparison to those low in social anxiety. Study Two revealed 
differences in self-kindness among those high versus low in social anxiety for a stressful in-lab 
task, albeit in the opposite direction of what was predicted. Study Three sought to replicate the 
results found from Study One, where those high in social anxiety displayed lower levels of self-
compassion in a social judgement domain than those low in social anxiety and compared to other 
domains. Study Three also attempts to uncover potential mechanisms for why these differences 
may emerge.  
Study Three 
 Study Three sought to replicate the interaction effect of domain and social anxiety on 
self-compassion that was found in Study One, while also exploring possible mechanisms that 
might account for these differences in self-compassion. Recall that in Study One, participants 
were randomly assigned to recall a personal event in one of the following three categories; social 
judgement, physical illness, or burnout. In Study One, the largest difference in self-compassion 
scores between individuals high versus individuals low in social anxiety was in the social 
judgement condition. Overall, participants felt relatively self-compassionate in the physical 
illness condition, and less self-compassionate in the burnout condition. In the social judgement 
domain however, individuals high in social anxiety felt less self-compassionate than those low in 
social anxiety. For Study Three two trait variables were added to the study before the 
manipulation of domain, to explore how they may relate to social anxiety and self-compassion. 
Three state variables were examined after the manipulation as potential mediators of the 
relationship between social anxiety and domain on state self-compassion. 
The two potential baseline trait variables explored were self-efficacy and locus of control. 
Self-efficacy, as established by Bandura (1994) is a person’s beliefs about their own capabilities 
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in a given domain and their ability to produce a desired effect or outcome. Self-efficacy has been 
shown to relate to motivation, self-image and well-being (Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-
Pons, 1992; Bacchini & Magliulo, 2003; Strobel, Tumasjan, & Sporrle, 2011). Individuals can 
have different beliefs about their abilities in certain domains; for example, feeling confident 
about one’s mathematical abilities but not about one’s capacity to perform a speech. However, 
we were most interested in participants’ general levels of self-efficacy, as lower levels of general 
self-efficacy have been linked to social anxiety and inhibition in social situations (Leary & 
Atherton, 1986; Thomasson & Psouni, 2010). We hypothesized that individuals high in social 
anxiety would have low levels of self-efficacy compared to those low in social anxiety. Next, 
locus of control was explored. Similar to the perceived control constructs from Study Two, locus 
of control refers to the degree to which individuals feel control over outcomes in their lives. An 
internal locus indicates a belief that one can control one’s own life, whereas an external locus 
indicates a belief that life is controlled by outside factors which a person cannot influence 
(Rotter, 1990). Locus of control was measured at baseline as an indicator of what individuals 
tend to attribute event outcomes to (internal or external factors). It was hypothesized that at the 
trait level, individuals high in social anxiety would hold a more external locus of control. 
Previous research has found such results (Watson, 1967; Emmelkamp & Cohen-Kettenis, 1975).  
 As noted above, there were also three state variables included as possible mechanisms in 
this study, including perceived control, self-blame and causal attributions. Perceived control in 
this study refers to how greatly (or not) the participant believes that the situation or event can be 
brought under their personal control (Conway & Terry, 1992). Specifically, does the participant 
feel that they have control over the outcome of the scenario? This is identical to the 
conceptualization from Study Two, in which situational perceptions of control were examined 
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post-manipulation. Lower perceived control has been linked to greater levels of anxiety (Endler, 
Speer, Johnson, & Flett, 2000). However, little research has explored the extent to which 
individuals with social anxiety perceive control over a situation itself. Furthermore, studies 
linking social anxiety and control typically explore behavioural control discussed in Study Two, 
indicating that individuals with social anxiety feel less behavioural control over their anxiety 
symptoms (Hofmann, 2005). To our knowledge, past research has not directly explored social 
anxiety, the domain of stress, and perceived control over the situation itself. In the present study, 
it was expected that individuals high in social anxiety would perceive less control over situations 
generally in comparison to those low in social anxiety. As we expected to replicate the 
differences found in Study One that those high in social anxiety would be less self-
compassionate in the domain of social judgement than those low in social anxiety, it was also 
hypothesized that perceived control would mediate this difference, as those high in social anxiety 
would feel less perceived control in this social domain, whereas those low in social anxiety 
would feel equally as much control in the social domain as in the other two domains. This lack of 
perceived control from those high in social anxiety in the social domain would consequently 
result in lower levels of self-compassion. Experiencing a lack of perceived control is related to 
negative adaptability and self-criticism (Sedikides & Luke, 2008). Self-criticism is the opposite 
of self-kindness, a component of self-compassion. Therefore, perceiving less control over an 
event may lead one to feel less self-compassionate, as they experience more self-criticism.   
 Another mechanism could be self-blame towards the outcome of the stressful event. 
Janoff-Bulman (1979) identified two different types of self-blame; characterological and 
behavioural. Characterological self-blame relates to esteem, in that an individual attributes blame 
to something internal about the self, and feels deserving of blame (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). 
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Behavioural self-blame conversely relates to control and external attributions, as the individual 
blames their behaviour (a modifiable source) rather than something about one’s personal 
characteristics (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). Gilbert and Miles (2000) found that self-blame was 
associated with social anxiety and other psychopathology; however, they did not explore the two 
differing types of self-blame with their measures. Therefore, it is unclear whether 
characterological self-blame or behavioural self-blame is associated with social anxiety. Given 
that individuals with social anxiety hold an internal self-focus and negative self-image (Clark & 
Wells, 1995), it is hypothesized that those higher in social anxiety endorse more 
characterological self-blame than behavioural. It is also hypothesized that characterological self-
blame will be more highly correlated with lessened self-compassion than behavioural self-blame, 
as one attacks their own character in characterological self-blame, being self-critical rather than 
self-kind. Therefore, it is hypothesized that characterological self-blame will mediate the 
relationship between social anxiety, domain, and self-compassion, as those high in social anxiety 
will feel more self-blame, particularly in the social judgement condition where they feel most 
vulnerable, resulting in lowered self-compassion. To potentially explain the lowered levels of 
state self-compassion in the burnout condition across all participants (high and low in social 
anxiety) that was found in Study One, it is hypothesized that individuals will be higher in self-
blame overall in this domain of stress. Participants may feel that they caused themselves to burn 
out by taking on too much, or not saying no, whereas they would not blame themselves as 
greatly for becoming physically ill. This would therefore lead to lower self-compassion, as they 
blame and are critical of themselves instead of being compassionate.  
 A final, third mechanism could be the kinds of attributions that individuals assign to the 
outcome of the event. Attribution style is how individuals explain the cause for positive and 
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negative events in their lives (Leary & Hoyle, 2009). Attributions can be personal (internal vs. 
external), permanent (stable vs. unstable) and pervasive (global vs. local/specific) (Abramson, 
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). Although attribution styles can be consistent over time, research 
has supported the malleability of attribution styles across differing domains (Cutrona, Russell, & 
Jones, 1984). Internal, stable, and global attributions have been found to relate to shyness, 
loneliness, depression, and general anxiety (Alfano, Joiner, Thomas, & Perry, 1994; Bell-Dolan 
& Wessler, 1994; Plana, Lavoie, Battaglia & Achim, 2014). Since loneliness is the opposite of 
common humanity, and depression and anxiety are linked to lower self-compassion, these 
internal, stable, global attributional causes of failure are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of 
self-compassion. The domain of physical illness may be more related to external attributions as 
typically one falls ill from external, environmental factors  (i.e., flu season), whereas the burnout 
domain may be associated more strongly with internal attributions, as one typically becomes 
burnt out from having too many things on the go (i.e. taking on too much at once). These causal 
attributions may support why Study One found that those in the physical illness condition had 
the highest levels of self-compassion, whereas those in burnout had lower levels of self-
compassion. The domain of social stress is where a difference in attributions is expected to occur 
between those high and low in social anxiety. As individuals with social anxiety hold a more 
negative, internal self-focus in socially evaluative situations (Clark & Wells, 1995), it is 
hypothesized that individuals high in social anxiety will attribute failings from the social 
judgement scenario to internal factors, whereas individuals low in social anxiety will attribute 
their failings to external factors. As such, attributing failure to internal, self-focused constructs is 
hypothesized to mediate the relationship between high social anxiety in the social domain and 
lower state self-compassion.  
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 Overall, Study Three was hypothesized to replicate the significant interaction found from 
Study One, where individuals high in social anxiety displayed the lowest levels of self-
compassion in the social judgement scenario. The two new baseline measures of self-efficacy 
and locus of control were hypothesized to relate to social anxiety levels and self-compassion in 
correlational analyses. Participants high in social anxiety were expected to exhibit lower levels of 
self-efficacy, and a more external locus. Finally, three new post-manipulation mechanisms were 
explored as mediators of the hypothesized interaction effect. Specifically, those high in social 
anxiety were hypothesized to feel lower control over the social judgement scenario in 
comparison to the other scenarios, feel more characterological self-blame in the social judgement 
scenario, and attribute the poor outcome of these social scenarios to internal, stable, and global 
causes, leading to lower self-compassion in comparison to the other scenarios and in comparison 
to those low in social anxiety. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 293 undergraduate students from Wilfrid Laurier University recruited 
through the Wilfrid Laurier PREP program, completing the study for partial course credit. 
Participants were once again selected for either high or low levels of social anxiety based on 
their scores from the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN, Connor et al. 2000) and the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Mattick & Clarke 1998) from mass testing. As in Study Two, 
participants were double-screened for social anxiety level, such that their scores from mass 
testing were compared to their scores at the time of participation in Study Three. Those whose 
scores from mass testing and time of participation had opposite categorizations at these two time-
points or differed by more than 10 points on the SPIN or SIAS from the categorization cut-offs 
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were excluded from data analysis (n=63). As a result, 42 participants classified as high social 
anxiety within the social judgement scenario condition, 46 recalling a physical illness scenario, 
and 37 recalling a time of burnout. For participants classified as low social anxiety, 36 
participants were randomly assigned to recall a social judgement scenario, 31 recalled a physical 
illness scenario, and 38 recalled a time of burnout. The sample was 83.6% female, with an 
average age of 19.92 (SD=4.33). The sample was 70.6% Caucasian, 11.8% Asian, 5.9% Middle 
Eastern/West Asian, 3.8% African Canadian, 1.7% Indigenous, and 5.9% identified as Other.  
Measures 
 All measures used in Study One were also used in Study Three, along with the perceived 
control scale used in Study Two, an adapted measure from Conway and Terry’s Event 
Perception measure (1992). The instructional wording was changed to reflect the answering of 
each statement in reference to the scenario the participant just recalled and described. The 
Cronbach alpha for this adapted measure for this specific study was .68. The state self-
compassion scale once again showed good to strong internal consistency (total scale =.94, self-
kindness =.88, common humanity =.81, mindfulness =.80). The following four additional 
measures were included in Study Three as potential mechanism variables. 
 The General Self-Efficacy scale (GSE) developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) 
was used as a baseline measure of self-efficacy. The scale contains 10 items on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1-not at all true to 4-exactly true. Participants rate how true each statement is 
of their typical behaviour and beliefs, with greater scores indicating greater levels of self-
efficacy. Items include “I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough” 
and “I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events”. The GSE has strong 
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reliability, construct validity, and stability (Leganger, Kraft, & Roysamb, 2000; Schwarzer, 
Muller, & Greenglass, 1999). 
 The Locus of Control scale (Rotter, 1966) contains 29 fixed-response items from which 
individuals choose one of two possible answers to a statement, depending on which answer they 
agree with more. An adapted, shortened version developed by Pettijohn (2003) was used in this 
study. The shortened version contains 20 true or false statements, 10 of which were reverse-
coded, and higher scores indicate greater internal locus of control. Sample items include “I 
usually get what I want in life”, “I do not really believe in luck or chance” and “The success I 
have is largely a matter of chance” (reverse-coded). Rotter’s original scale has shown good 
internal consistency and has relatively stable one-month test-retest reliability (Rotter, 1966). 
Abbreviated forms of Rotter’s original scale have indicated similar psychometric properties to 
the original 29-item scale (Valecha & Ostrom, 1974; Shapurian & Hojat, 1987). 
 A six-item self-blame scale was created to assess feelings of responsibility and self-blame 
in this study context. These items came partially from research on the two types of self-blame; 
behavioural and characterological (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). Two of the six items assessed 
behavioural self-blame (e.g., “To what extent did this situation happen because of something you 
did or did not do?”) and two of the six items assessed characterological self-blame (e.g., “How 
likely is it that something like this will happen to you again because of your personal 
characteristics?”). The final two items assessed feelings of responsibility towards the situational 
outcome (e.g., “How responsible do you feel for the outcome of the situation?”). The overall 
Cronbach alpha for the scale was .80. 
 The Casual Dimension Scale II is used to assess the internal and external attributions 
used by individuals for causes of a situation. The scale was originally developed by Russell 
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(1982), and then revised in 1992 by McAuley, Duncan, and Russell. The revised scale shows 
good internal consistency and strong construct validity (McAuley, Duncan & Russell, 1992) and 
contains 12 items measuring four dimensions of attributions; locus of causality, external control, 
stability, and personal control. The items are ranked on a scale from 9 to 1 with statements on 
either fixed end that reflect opposing views about the cause of the situation. For example, an item 
that gauges locus of causality is “is this cause something: That reflects an aspect of yourself OR 
reflects an aspect of the situation” where “or” is substituted for numeric values ranging from 9 to 
1. An item that assesses external control is “is this cause something: Other people can regulate 
OR other people cannot regulate”. An example item that measures stability is “is this cause 
something: Permanent OR temporary”, and finally, an example item that measures personal 
control is “is this cause something: Manageable by you OR not manageable by you”. The 
Cronbach alpha levels for the four subscales were as follows; locus of causality, α=.52, external 
control, α=.76, stability, α=.42, and personal control, α=.81. 
Procedure 
 Study Three used the same procedure as Study One, with the addition of new measures in 
the online survey that participants completed. Participants completed the study entirely online, 
working through three sections of the online survey. The first section contained questions about 
basic demographic information, social anxiety, self-efficacy, locus of control, self-compassion, 
self-esteem, depression, and subjective distress. Then participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions in which they had to recall a scenario from their own experience. The same 
three conditions were used as in Study One; a social judgement scenario, and time when they 
were physically ill, and a time when they were burnt out. Next, participants completed post-
scenario measures similar to those used in Study One, rating how well they were able to recall 
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the scenario, how important the scenario was to them, etc. Participants were also asked to 
indicate how long ago the recalled situation took place, to address the possible limitation from 
Study One that participants differed in how long ago the event recalled took place, potentially 
influencing recollection capacity. Finally, state measures of subjective distress, self-compassion, 
anxiety, post-event processing, perceived control, feelings of responsibility and self-blame, and 
internal vs. external attributions were administered. After completing all scales, participants 
completed a suspicion probe, mood boosting task, and were then debriefed.  
Data Analysis 
 Univariate ANOVAs were conducted first on all baseline measures, using social anxiety 
level and condition as the independent variables. Next, post-manipulation measures, including 
state self-compassion and its subscales, were then analyzed using univariate ANOVAs with 
Social Anxiety Level and Condition as the independent variables. Where an interaction effect 
emerged, Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference test was used to examine what the simple 
main effects of the interaction were. Next, moderated mediation analyses were conducted on the 
relationship between condition and state self-compassion using all post-manipulation scales and 
subscales. The moderator for the a and ϲ’ pathways was social anxiety level. This moderated 
mediation analysis was conducted using Model 8 from the third version of the PROCESS 
software developed by Andrew F. Hayes (2018). It is important to note that since we had a 
multicategorical independent variable (scenario condition has three levels) with no true control 
group, it was decided that the social judgement condition would be dummy coded as the 
reference group which physical illness and burnout would be compared to. This was done 
because the social judgement condition was the condition we cared most about, and therefore, 
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seeing how the other two conditions were similar to, or contrasted, this condition felt most 
crucial. 
 Finally, qualitative analyses were conducted on participants’ open-ended responses to the 
three scenario conditions. This was done to understand whether participants were referencing 
inherently different, or similar, events within each condition. Two independent undergraduate 
raters coded participants’ responses within each scenario condition. The social judgement 
condition was then further analyzed into three sub-categories of social judgement, as it displayed 
variability in the types of responses participants gave. A univariate ANOVA with trait self-
compassion as the dependent measure, and social anxiety level and these new sub-categories of 
social judgement as the independent variables, was conducted to see whether there were trait-
level differences in self-compassion that may have led participants to list different types of social 
events in the social judgement condition. Then, a univariate ANOVA with state self-compassion 
as the dependent measure, and social anxiety levels and the sub-categories as independent 
variables, was conducted to determine whether these different types of social judgement events 
resulted in differing levels of state self-compassion. 
Results 
Baseline Measures 
 Univariate ANOVAs were conducted on the baseline measures of trait self-compassion, 
self-efficacy, locus of control, self-esteem, depression, and subjective distress. Table 8 displays 
the descriptive statistics for each variable across conditions and social anxiety groups. Overall, 
there was a significant main effect of social anxiety for all baseline measures. Those high in 
social anxiety reported significantly lower levels of trait self-compassion, F(1,208)=77.85, 
p<.001, self-efficacy, F(1,218)=68.42, p<.001, and self-esteem, F(1,219)=83.71, p<.001, than  
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Table 8 
Study Three Baseline Variables across Conditions and Social Anxiety Groups 
 High Social Anxiety Low Social Anxiety 
 Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Trait SCS 63.73 2.33 65.40 2.20 62.56 2.53 76.00 2.57 85.53 2.62 83.52 2.57 
Self-Efficacy 26.90 .67 27.07 .63 26.39 .70 32.33 .70 31.03 .76 31.06 .70 
Locus of 
Control 
52.14 1.88 49.57 1.80 55.43 2.06 49.29 2.06 49.52 2.19 46.45 1.98 
SISE 3.15 .24 3.24 .22 3.06 .25 5.06 .26 4.87 .28 5.03 .24 
Depression 2.95 .15 2.80 .14 2.92 .16 2.14 .16 1.97 .18 2.08 .16 
SUDS 3.07 .15 2.98 .14 2.73 .16 2.64 .16 2.45 .17 2.47 .16 
Note. SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, SISE = Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale. 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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those low in social anxiety. As well, individuals high in social anxiety reported greater external 
locus of control, F(1,220)=7.83, p=.006, greater levels of depression, F(1,223)=41.85, p<.001, 
and greater levels of subjective distress before the manipulation, F(1,223)=10.03, p=.002, 
compared to those low in social anxiety. Unexpectedly, there was also a main effect of condition 
that approached significance for trait self-compassion, F(2,208)=2.816, p=.062. Those who were 
randomly assigned to the social judgement scenario reported lower levels of trait self-
compassion than those randomly assigned to the physical illness and burnout scenarios. There 
were no significant group by condition interactions for any baseline variable and no other main 
effects of condition. Post-manipulation analyses were conducted both controlling for, and not 
controlling for trait self-compassion. Results are presented without controlling for trait self-
compassion; however, when a significant difference emerged from controlling for trait self-
compassion, it was noted. 
Post-Manipulation Condition Comparison Items 
 After participants completed the writing task for the scenario they were randomly 
assigned to, they completed six items in order to compare across conditions on importance of the  
scenario recalled, ability to recall aspects of the scenario, etc.  Table 9 displays the means and 
standard deviations for all post-scenario recall items. All post-hoc analyses on significant main 
effects of condition and significant interaction effects utilized Tukey’s Honest Significant 
Difference test. There were no significant differences on how long ago the scenario occurred in 
relation to the day the participants took part in the study. There were also no significant 
differences on how well participants were able to remember the situation. However, there was a 
significant main effect of condition on how well participants were able to recall thoughts they 
had during the scenario, F(2,223)=3.947, p=.021. Those in the burnout scenario recalled more  
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Table 9 
Study Three Condition Comparison Items 
 High Social Anxiety   Low Social Anxiety 
 
  
 Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Remember 3.98 .15 3.85 .14 3.97 .16 3.86 .16 4.16 .17 4.26 .15 
Recall thoughts 3.98 .14 3.76 .13 4.08 .15 3.66 .15 4.03 .16 4.34 .15 
Anxiety 4.21 .17 3.70 .16 4.27 .18 3.43 .18 3.13 .19 4.18 .17 
Control 2.14 .17 1.87 .16 1.87 .18 2.54 .19 2.23 .20 2.42 .18 
Importance 3.05 .17 3.07 .16 4.05 .18 3.17 .19 3.16 .20 4.26 .18 
Time 34.73 5.89 50.47 5.68 35.03 6.30 34.11 6.30 37.69 6.92 26.26 6.69 
Note. Time is measured in days since the event. 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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thoughts than those in both the social judgement and physical illness scenarios (p=.028 and 
p=.055 respectively). As well, there was a significant main effect of condition on the importance 
of the recalled scenario, F(2,223)=22.405, p<.001. Those in the burnout scenario felt that the 
scenario was more important than those in the social judgement and physical illness scenarios 
(p<.001 for both). There was a main effect of social anxiety on how much control participants 
felt they had over the situation, F(1,223)=8.712, p=.003. Those high in social anxiety felt 
significantly less control over the scenarios than those low in social anxiety. Finally, there were 
main effects of social anxiety and condition on the level of anxiety participants felt during the 
scenario. Those high in social anxiety felt greater levels of anxiety than those low in social 
anxiety, F(1,223)=11.378, p=.001. The main effect of condition, F(2,223)=10.868, p<.001, 
indicated that those in the burnout scenario felt greater anxiety than those in the physical illness 
scenario (p<.001).  
State Self-Compassion and Subscales 
 Table 10 displays the means and standard deviations for all self-compassion scales. There 
were significant main effects of social anxiety and condition; however, contrary to our  
hypotheses and previous results from Study One, no significant interaction effect emerged. 
Those high in social anxiety were less self-compassionate than those low in social anxiety, 
F(1,215)=55.525, p<.001. For the main effect of condition (F(2,215)=13.994, p<.001), those in 
the physical illness scenario were more self-compassionate than those in the social judgement 
and burnout scenarios (p=.044 and p<.001 respectively). Figure 3 displays these results. In 
examining the three subscales of the self-compassion scale, the main effects of social anxiety and 
condition remained consistent across all three facets. For the self-kindness subscale, individuals 
high in social anxiety were significantly less self-kind than those low in social anxiety, and those  
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Table 10 
Study Three State Self-Compassion across Conditions and Social Anxiety Groups 
 High Social Anxiety Low Social Anxiety 
 Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
State SCS 69.59 2.73 78.23 2.57 62.97 2.81 86.97 2.85 95.41 3.29 80.32 2.77 
Self-
Kindness 
25.71 1.18 29.46 1.11 22.35 1.24 31.47 1.25 36.36 1.35 28.79 1.22 
Common 
Humanity 
21.95 .94 24.89 .88 19.84 .98 27.53 .99 29.57 1.13 25.82 .97 
Mindfulness 22.63 .87 23.96 .83 20.78 .90 27.97 .92 28.86 1.02 25.71 .89 
Note. SCS = Self-Compassion Scale 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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Figure 3 
Study Three State Self-Compassion Results  
 
 
in the physical illness scenario were significantly more self-kind than those in the social 
judgement (p=.005) and burnout (p<.001) scenarios. For the common humanity subscale, those 
high in social anxiety felt significantly less common humanity than those low in social anxiety, 
and those in the physical illness scenario felt significantly more common humanity than those in 
the burnout scenario (p<.001) but not the social judgement scenario (p=.087). Similarly, for the 
mindfulness subscale, those high in social anxiety were significantly less mindful than those low 
in social anxiety, and those in the physical illness scenario were significantly more mindful than 
those in the burnout scenario (p=.011) but not the social judgement scenario (p=.685). Again, no 
hypothesized interaction effect emerged for any of the subscales.  
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 The effects of state self-compassion were re-analyzed controlling for state anxiety and 
subjective distress after the manipulation. Controlling for state anxiety, the main effects of both 
social anxiety and condition were retained, F(1,206)=33.32, p<.001 and F(2,206)=9.31, p<.001, 
respectively. As well, when controlling for post-manipulation subjective distress, both main 
effects were retained, F(1,214)=47.19, p<.001 and F(2,214)=12.03, p<.001. 
Other Post-Manipulation State Measures 
Subjective distress, the causal dimension scale, perceptions of control, blame, and state 
anxiety were all assessed after the scenario manipulation. Table 11 displays the means and 
standard deviations for all measures listed. Similar to the subjective distress rating before the 
manipulation, there was a main effect of social anxiety, such that participants high in social 
anxiety experienced greater subjective distress after the manipulation compared to those low in 
social anxiety, F(1,224)=6.591, p=.011.  
For state anxiety, there was a significant main effect of social anxiety and of condition, 
but no significant interaction effect. Those high in social anxiety felt greater levels of state 
anxiety than those low in social anxiety, F(1,214)=24.498, p<.001. For the main effect of 
condition, F(2,214)=12.148, p<.001, individuals in the burnout scenario felt significantly more 
anxiety than those in the social judgement and physical illness scenarios, p<.001 for both. 
For post-event processing, there was a significant main effect of social anxiety, such that 
those high in social anxiety engaged in significantly more post-event processing than those low 
in social anxiety, F(1,217)=21.33, p<.001. As well, a significant main effect of condition 
emerged, F(2,217)=12.15, p<.001, such that those in the physical illness condition engaged in 
significantly less post-event processing than both the social judgement (p=.003) and burnout 
(p<.001) scenarios. 
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Table 11  
Study Three Additional Post-Manipulation State Variables 
 High Social Anxiety   Low Social Anxiety 
 
  
 Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout Social 
Judgement 
Physical Illness Burnout 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
SUDS 3.21 .16 2.89 .15 3.19 .17 2.69 .17 2.65 .18 2.92 .16 
STAI-S 63.12 1.76 61.75 1.70 66.57 1.96 51.92 1.88 52.48 2.09 64.24 1.86 
PEPI-S 41.33 1.79 34.00 1.67 43.06 1.89 33.42 1.86 27.73 2.04 36.34 1.81 
Causal Dimension Subscales             
Locus 11.67 .78 13.02 .75 12.36 .85 13.14 .86 12.07 .91 13.71 .82 
External 14.33 .90 20.15 .86 16.42 .97 16.66 .99 19.48 1.05 18.53 .95 
Stability 17.21 .77 18.84 .74 17.81 .83 18.06 .84 18.61 .89 19.34 .81 
Personal 12.98 .82 17.33 .88 13.00 1.01 10.23 1.01 13.61 1.07 10.79 .97 
Perceived Control Items             
Beyond 
control 
2.98 .19 3.71 .18 3.03 .20 2.70 .20 3.32 .22 2.63 .20 
Change 
situation 
2.97 .19 2.63 .18 3.47 .21 3.39 .21 2.87 .22 3.74 .20 
Acceptance 3.55 .19 3.60 .18 3.19 .21 3.50 .21 3.32 .22 3.16 .20 
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Steps to resolve 2.91 .18 3.04 .17 3.42 .19 3.28 .19 3.23 .21 3.50 .19 
External 2.60 .19 3.11 .19 2.78 .21 2.94 .21 3.00 .23 2.40 .21 
Internal 3.60 .19 2.87 .18 3.78 .20 3.44 .20 2.94 .22 3.51 .20 
Blame Items             
Kind of person 3.60 .20 2.20 .19 3.22 .22 2.78 .22 1.58 .23 2.74 .21 
Action 3.24 .20 2.67 .19 3.42 .22 3.56 .22 2.74 .23 3.16 .21 
Deserving 2.83 .19 2.28 .18 2.94 .20 2.47 .20 1.87 .22 2.70 .20 
Personal 
character 
3.83 .19 2.78 .18 3.86 .21 3.11 .21 2.23 .22 2.95 .20 
Behaviour 3.64 .19 2.87 .19 3.67 .21 2.83 .21 2.45 .23 2.95 .20 
Responsible 3.64 .18 2.85 .17 3.92 .19 3.33 .19 2.36 .21 3.61 .19 
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale, STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Version, PEPI-S = Post-Event 
Processing Inventory – State Version. 
Note.  = significant main effect of social anxiety level,  = significant main effect of condition, = significant interaction effect. 
Subscripts listed for significant interaction effects only. 
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For the causal dimension scale, the four subscales of locus, external control, personal 
control, and stability, were examined. There were no significant differences across the locus and 
stability subscales. However, there was a main effect of condition for the external control 
subscale, F(2,222)=10.346, p<.001. As hypothesized, those in the physical illness scenario 
attributed the outcome of the event to significantly more external causes than the social  
judgement scenario (p<.001) and the burnout scenario (p=.034). Similarly, for the personal 
control subscale, there was a main effect of social anxiety in line with our hypothesis, such that 
those high in social anxiety attributed the outcome to more internal events than those low in 
social anxiety, F(1,221)=13.189, p<.001. As well, there was a main effect of condition, 
F(2,221)=9.757, p<.001 where those in the physical illness scenario felt more personal causes 
than those in the social judgement and burnout scenarios (p<.001 for both). This was contrary to 
our hypothesis, as we expected those in the burnout scenario to feel more internal causes for the 
event outcome.  
Six items assessed the level of control individuals perceived over the situation they 
recalled. There were no significant differences in how much participants accepted the situation 
because they could not change it, how much they felt they could take steps to resolve the 
situations, and how much external influence they felt over the situation recalled. However, there 
were main effects of condition on how much participants felt they could change the situation, 
F(2,223)=6.300, p=.002, and how much internal influence they felt over the situation, 
F(2,222)=7.846, p=.001. Those in the physical illness scenario felt less able to change compared 
to those in the burnout scenario, p=.001, and those in the physical illness scenario felt less 
internal influence than the social judgement and burnout conditions (p=.004 and p=.001 
respectively). Finally, there was a main effect of social anxiety and a main effect of condition, 
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F(2,223)=7.931, p<.001, on how strongly participants felt the scenario was beyond their control. 
Those high in social anxiety felt that the situation was beyond their control more than those low 
in social anxiety, F(1,223)=4.862, p=.028. Those in the physical illness scenario felt the situation 
was beyond their control more than those in the other two scenarios (p=.001 for both social 
judgement and burnout). 
To measure feelings of blame towards the outcomes of the scenarios recalled, six items 
were used. All items had a significant main effect of social anxiety level and condition, except 
for the item assessing how much participants attributed the outcome to something they did or did 
not do, where only a main effect of condition emerged, F(2,223)=6.086, p=.003. Those in the 
physical illness scenario blamed themselves significantly less than the social judgement scenario 
(p=.004) and the burnout scenario (p=.017). For all other items, individuals high in social anxiety 
had greater levels of self-blame, felt they deserved the bad outcome more, attributed the outcome 
to personal characteristics and their own behaviour, and felt more responsible for the poor 
outcome than those low in social anxiety. In regard to the main effect of condition, those in the 
physical illness condition blamed themselves less, felt less deserving of the poor outcome, 
attributed the outcome less to personal characteristics and their own behaviour, and felt less 
responsible for the outcome than those in the other two scenarios. There were no significant 
interaction effects.  
All post-manipulation analyses were additionally run controlling for the baseline 
difference in trait self-compassion that was marginally significant across conditions. For most 
variables, no change in the pattern of results occurred when controlling for this baseline 
difference, however, for state anxiety, a significant interaction emerged, F(2,199)=5.27, p=.006. 
Those low in social anxiety were significantly more anxious in the burnout condition than the 
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other two conditions (p<.001 for both), whereas for those high in social anxiety, there were no 
significant differences in anxiety across conditions.  
Correlations were run between state self-compassion, locus of control, self-efficacy, 
perceived control, feelings of blame, and causality of the outcome of the scenario. Table 12 
displays the correlations, alongside the Cronbach alphas for each scale. Feelings of self-blame  
correlated most highly with state self-compassion and was therefore the first mechanism variable 
used in a moderated mediation analysis to see whether self-blame mediated the relationship 
between scenario condition and state self-compassion. The scenario condition variable was 
entered as the primary independent variable, state self-compassion was entered as the dependent 
variable, social anxiety level was entered as the moderator of both the a and ϲ’ pathways, and a 
total score for self-blame was entered as the mediation variable. In starting with the a pathway 
connecting scenario condition to the blame mediator, with social anxiety as a potential 
moderator, there was a significant effect, F(5,213)=11.98, p<.001 which was primarily driven by 
the physical illness condition, p<.001. The potential moderation of social anxiety was not 
significant for this pathway. Next, the ϲ’ pathway connecting scenario condition to state self-
compassion was examined, with social anxiety again as the potential moderator. This pathway 
was also significant, F(6,212)=13.73, p<.001, and again, the moderation of social anxiety level 
was not significant. The b pathway was significant, as blame significantly predicted state self-
compassion, p=.012. Finally, in examining the indirect effects which reveal the overall pathway 
of scenario condition through the mediator of blame to state self-compassion, the physical illness 
condition was significant (CI: 0.54 and 5.56 and CI: 0.73 –and6.24 for low and high social 
anxiety respectively) with no significant index of moderation from social anxiety level. In 
looking at the directionality of the coefficients, individuals in the physical illness condition  
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Table 12 
Study Three Correlations Between Mechanisms Variables and State Self-Compassion 
 State 
SCS 
POC Blame CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 LOC Self-
Efficacy 
State SCS - -.045 -.283** .183* .124 .079 -.170 -.139 .195* 
POC .009 - -.411** .262** -.025 -.110 .571** -.073 -.028 
Blame -.270** -.459** - -.261** -.178* -.085 -.377** .090 -.075 
CD1 .096 .315** -.319** - -.080 .084 .153 -.091 .047 
CD2 .281** -.298** .129 -.319** - .170 .059 -.052 .190* 
CD3 -.092 -.096 .200* -.019 .107 - -.086 -.140 .040 
CD4 -.177 .640** -.338** .281** -.254** .016 - -.169 -.115 
LOC -.077 .176 -.080 .085 -.226** -.050 .168 - .008 
Self-Efficacy .394** -.111 -.025 -.195* .119 .068 -.018 .009 - 
Note. Everything above the diagonal represents correlations for data from those high in social anxiety. Everything below the diagonal 
represents correlations for data from those low in social anxiety. 
Note. SCS = Self-Compassion Scale, POC = Perceptions of Control, CD1 = Causal Dimension Subscale 1 - Locus, CD2 = Causal 
Dimension Subscale 2 - Stability, CD3 = Causal Dimension Subscale 3 – External Control, CD4 = Causal Dimension Subscale 4 – 
Personal Control, LOC = Locus of Control scale. 
Note. * = significant at p<.05, **= significant at p<.001  
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display lower levels of self-blame, leading to greater levels of self-compassion, regardless of 
social anxiety level.  
From the Causal Dimension Scale, the external control and personal control subscales 
appear to also mediate the relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion 
when used as mediators in the same model as described above. External control was significant 
as a mediator of the relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion, 
F(6,212)=13.32, p<.001. Again, social anxiety level did not moderate the results found by 
scenario condition. Indirect effects revealed that those in the physical illness condition drove this 
mediation (CI: 0.22 and 6.05). Those in the physical illness condition felt more external control, 
which led to greater levels of self-compassion. Similarly, using personal control over the 
outcome as a potential mediator of condition and state self-compassion was significant, 
F(6,211)=16.24, p<.001. Those in the physical illness condition also felt more personal control, 
leading to greater levels of self-compassion.  
Perceived control, as well as the locus and stability subscales of the Causal Dimension 
Scale, were also used as mediators in their respective moderated mediation models, however 
none of these variables displayed significant indirect effects, indicating that they did not mediate 
the relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion. 
Given that social anxiety did not moderate the effects in any of the significant moderated 
mediation models, simple mediation models with all mechanism variables were also conducted. 
The predictor variable was scenario condition, with the social judgement condition once again 
used as the reference variable (allowing a comparison of social judgement with each of physical 
illness and burnout), and state self-compassion was the outcome variable. Again, perceived 
control, as well as the locus and stability subscales of the Causal Dimension Scale did not 
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mediate the relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion. Self-blame once 
again mediated the relationship for the physical illness condition, as shown by the confidence 
interval of the indirect effect, CI: 2.23 and 7.79. Those in the physical illness condition felt less 
self-blame, resulting in greater levels of self-compassion. As well, the external control subscale 
of the Causal Dimension Scale was a significant mediator for both the physical illness and 
burnout conditions based on indirect effects (CI:0.58 and 5.60 and CI: 0.06 and 3.07 
respectively). Those in the physical illness condition felt greater levels of external control, which 
led to greater self-compassion, whereas those in the burnout condition felt greater levels of 
external control which led to lower levels of self-compassion. Similarly, the personal control 
subscale also significantly mediated the relationship, but only for the physical illness condition 
(CI: 2.09 and 7.61). Those in the physical illness condition felt more personal control over the 
outcome of the event, leading to greater levels of self-compassion.  
Qualitative Coding for Social Judgement Scenario Descriptions for Study One and Study 
Three  
 Coding of the qualitative responses in Study Three was done to explore differences in 
self-compassion within condition. The qualitative responses from Study One were combined 
with the responses from Study Three to create a larger sample size so that analyses could be run 
within each condition. The social judgement scenarios were of greatest interest, as this was the 
domain which was hypothesized to show differences in state self-compassion by social anxiety 
level. For both the physical illness and burnout responses, there was little variability in the types 
of scenarios participants recalled. Two independent undergraduate raters coded responses for 
these two conditions and found similar levels of uniformity among responses. For Study One, 
more than 80% of participants in the physical illness condition recalled an acute illness such as a 
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cold or flu. Similarly, in the burnout condition, over 85% of participants discussed feeling burnt 
out from school or managing school with other areas of their lives. For Study Three, over 75% of 
participants recalled an acute illness in the physical illness condition, and over 90% of 
participants discussed school or school-life balance related burnout in the burnout condition.  
However, there was variability in the type of social judgement situation participants 
reported, consistent with the construct of social anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Three categories of social judgement were identified by two independent undergraduate 
coders; presenting/performing in front of others, interacting with others (i.e., having a casual 
conversation with peers), and being observed by others (i.e., walking through a crowded hallway 
or attending a party, with no mention of interaction with others). Cohen’s Kappa was used to 
calculate inter-rater reliability between the two raters for the social judgement condition. There 
was moderate agreement between the two coders, ĸ=.660, p<.001. Any disagreement between 
coders was resolved by myself. Next, an ANOVA was run comparing the type of social 
judgement situation and social anxiety group on state self-compassion. Note the other scenario 
conditions (burnout, physical illness) were not included in this analysis. There were significant 
main effects of both social anxiety, F(1,121)=22.77, p<.001, and type of social judgement 
scenario, F(2,121)=2.93, p=.036, but no significant interaction. Participants high in social 
anxiety displayed lower levels of state self-compassion than those low in social anxiety, and 
those who recalled a social judgement scenario involving interacting with others had 
significantly greater levels of state self-compassion than those who recalled a presentation or 
being observed by others (p=.008 and p=.001). 
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Discussion 
Study Three was designed to replicate the findings from Study One that those high in 
social anxiety are significantly less self-compassionate in social domains than other areas of 
stress. It was also designed to explore potential mechanisms as to why these differences in 
domain-specific self-compassion might occur. Unfortunately, Study Three failed to replicate the 
significant interaction found in Study One, where those high in social anxiety displayed lower 
levels of self-compassion in the social judgement scenario compared to the physical illness 
scenario, whereas those low in social anxiety displayed the lowest levels of self-compassion for 
burnout. However, the significant main effect of condition that emerged does provide support for 
the idea that self-compassion can vary based on the domain of stress. Those in the physical 
illness scenario showed the greatest levels of self-compassion, whereas those in the burnout 
scenario displayed the lowest levels of self-compassion. Potential reasons for the interaction 
replication failure, as well as some exploration of mechanisms to explain these condition 
differences in self-compassion are discussed below. 
 One potential reason for the nonsignificant interaction effect of social anxiety and 
condition on state self-compassion in Study Three could stem from the post-scenario condition 
comparison questions. These items assessed participants’ ability to recall their thoughts, feelings, 
and the level of importance of the scenarios being discussed within each condition. In Study 
Three, significant effects of condition indicated that individuals in the burnout scenario recalled 
more thoughts about the scenario itself, felt greater anxiety about the scenario, and felt that the 
scenario was more important than those recalling social judgement or physical illness scenarios. 
There were no significant differences on these items in Study One, which could indicate that 
participants in Study Three were more affected by the burnout scenarios they recalled than 
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participants from Study One in the burnout scenario. These differences may help to explain why, 
in Study Three, individuals high in social anxiety showed lower self-compassion in the burnout 
scenario than in the social judgement scenario, whereas participants high in social anxiety in 
Study One displayed lower self-compassion in the social judgement scenario than in the burnout 
scenario. Perhaps burnout was more severe for all participants in Study Three. 
 A second potential explanation for the differences found between Study One and Study 
Three could have to do with the timing of when the studies took place. Although Study Three 
followed the same recruitment procedure as Study One, it is important to note that Study One 
data was collected primarily in February and March of 2019, while Study Three data was 
collected primarily in late November and early December of 2019. As the population recruited 
for both samples was undergraduate students, many of whom were in their first year of 
university, these timeline differences may be important. For Study One, participants had already 
gone through their first semester of university and were now halfway into their second semester. 
For many Study Three participants however, they were nearing the end of their very first 
semester of university and approaching their first-ever university exams. Although the data does 
not indicate significant differences in the level of subjective distress participants felt across both 
studies, it is possible that students in Study Three had more underlying burnout, given that many 
of them were in their first semester of university, and that exam period was approaching. 
Qualitative coding was done to determine whether participants discussed different scenarios 
across the two studies; however, no differences emerged. Overall, participants in the burnout 
scenario discussed school burnout most often in both studies, but given the findings from the 
post-scenario recall items previously discussed, perhaps the salience of the burnout scenarios in 
Study Three was stronger. 
 82 
 The qualitative coding for the social judgement scenarios across both Study One and 
Study Three were done due to a greater variability of responses from participants in this 
condition. There was a general theme of similarity across the physical illness and burnout 
scenarios listed by participants, such that those in the physical illness scenario generally recalled 
an acute illness and those in the burnout scenario generally discussed school and balancing 
school with other aspects of their life. However, the social judgement scenarios displayed more 
distinct sub-categories of scenarios. Following along with the DSM-5 conceptualization of social 
anxiety disorder, participant responses were either categorized as giving a presentation, 
interacting with peers or being observed by others (APA, 2013). It is possible that different types 
of stress were elicited from these categories and therefore, it was important to examine whether 
these individual sub-categories of social judgement resulted in differing levels of state self-
compassion. Post-hoc, it was hypothesized that state self-compassion levels may be influenced 
by both the level of social anxiety, and the type of social judgement scenario that participants 
recalled, providing some further support for domain- and person-specific self-compassion. 
Unfortunately, no interaction effects emerged from this additional coding, however the main 
effect of condition supports the idea that different types of social judgement elicit more or less 
self-compassion. Participants who recalled a social judgement scenario involving an interaction 
with peers felt greater self-compassion than those who gave a presentation or felt they were 
being observed by others. Perhaps the interaction scenarios contained fewer individuals than the 
presentation and observation scenarios, therefore eliciting less anxiety and allowing for greater 
levels of self-compassion. Or perhaps there is something about engaging with others that allows 
a person to feel more self-compassion. Previous research on eating-related disorders and 
concerns of body image has found relationships between self-compassion and peer interaction. 
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When individuals feel greater levels of self-compassion, they are less likely to be negatively 
affected by peer interactions, and have less negative body-images (Kelly, Miller & Stephen, 
2016). It would be helpful for future research to explore the relationship between these specific 
types of social judgement in relation to self-compassion and social anxiety, and to explore 
mechanisms behind why some types of social judgement may lead to greater self-compassion 
than others.  
 When examining the potential mechanism variables used in Study Three, one distinct 
result emerged across all variables that is worth noting. Where a main effect of condition was 
present in follow-up variables of perceived control, blame, and causal attributions, those in the 
physical illness condition responded differently than those in the social judgement and burnout 
conditions. Overall, participants in the physical illness condition attributed the situation less to 
their internal qualities, felt less control over the situation, and blamed themselves less than those 
recalling social judgement or burnout scenarios. Although these physical illness results seem 
intuitive, the pattern of similarity in how participants in both the burnout and social judgement 
scenarios responded to these mechanism variables is intriguing. Although the qualitative 
situations recalled for the social judgement and burnout scenarios were quite different, perhaps 
the same features of stress (perceived control, self-blame, and attribution style) are present in 
both scenarios. This would explain why participants in both Study One and Study Three display 
greater self-compassion in the physical illness condition, as they feel less responsible toward the 
stressful situation than they do in the social judgement and burnout scenarios.  
 Despite no significant interaction effect emerging from condition and social anxiety level 
on state self-compassion, the mechanism variables hypothesized were still explored. This was 
done through moderated mediation analyses using the scenario condition variable (which did 
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have a significant main effect on state self-compassion) as the independent variable, and social 
anxiety level as the moderator. There was no evidence to support the notion that social anxiety 
level played a role in the relationship between scenario condition and state self-compassion 
across all moderated mediations conducted. Self-blame and the external and personal control 
subscales from the causal dimension scale mediated the relationship between condition and state 
self-compassion. It is important to note that while the external and personal control subscales of 
the causal dimension scale are not polar opposites to one another, it is surprising that both 
subscales work in similar directions to increase self-compassion for those in the physical illness 
conditions. This similar directionality seems counter-intuitive, and upon examining the questions 
from the scale a bit more in-depth (post-hoc of course), it is possible that participants had more 
openness to interpret the statements from the causal attribution scale as applying to either 
themselves or others, in comparison to the other scales used. For example, whereas the self-
blame and perceived control scales directly tell participants to reference the scenario they 
recalled in the manipulation in every individual item of the scales, the causal dimension scale 
only instructs participants to reference the event recalled from the manipulation in its initial 
instructions. Each individual item on the causal dimension scale does not contain this event 
reminder. Therefore, it is possible that when reading the external control items, which reference 
other people, participants imagined what other people would do in the scenario they recalled 
(e.g., “Was this cause(s) something over which others have control?”). However, in the personal 
control items, which reference the self (e.g., “Was this cause(s) something about you?”), 
participants may have self-referenced.  
 Overall, having self-blame as a mediator of the relationship between scenario condition 
and state self-compassion fits best, both conceptually and from our hypotheses. Those in the 
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physical illness have the lowest levels of self-blame, and the highest levels of self-compassion, 
regardless of social anxiety level. It makes sense that when individuals can attribute blame 
elsewhere and feel less guilt and responsibility for a poor outcome, they are more likely to 
express kindness and compassion to themselves. It is surprising that perceived control did not 
mediate the relationship between condition and state self-compassion. However, this lack of 
findings does pair well with the findings from Study Two in which situational perceptions of 
control failed to mediate the relationship between social anxiety level, condition, and state self-
kindness. Future research should examine the relationship between self-compassion and 
perceived control, as there are many differing ways to define perceived control, and perhaps our 
construction of this variable did not fit well with self-compassion.  
 One potential limitation of Study Three attempting to replicate Study One may have been 
the timing of when each study took place, in relation to the sample population used. Therefore, 
future research should attempt to replicate Study One using the same paradigm as utilized here in 
Study Three, perhaps with different populations to understand why differences emerged across 
these two studies. Alternatively, another direction for future research would be to look at 
controlling these time differences by administering the study at the same time in the school year 
for two different years, to see whether the time of year matters for this population, and for the 
burnout condition specifically. As well, given the findings on several mechanism variables 
indicate that recalling a time when you felt physically ill is inherently different from recalling a 
time when you felt socially judged or burnt out, other scenario conditions should be explored that 
are more similar to burnout and social judgement, to evaluate whether feelings of blame, 
perceptions of control, and attribution style, influence levels of state self-compassion. Perhaps 
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some of these mechanism variables are more relevant for certain scenarios or hold a stronger 
influence over state self-compassion.  
General Discussion 
 Study One provided initial support for a domain-specific conceptualization of self-
compassion, as it relates to social anxiety. Self-compassion levels were relatively high for 
participants in the physical illness scenario, relatively low for those in the burnout scenario, and 
fluctuated most greatly based on social anxiety level in the social judgement scenario. Those 
high in social anxiety were least self-compassionate in the social judgement domain whereas 
those low in social anxiety were least self-compassionate in the burnout domain. Study Two 
similarly found an interaction effect of social anxiety and domain but only for the self-kindness 
facet of self-compassion, such that those high in social anxiety displayed differing levels of self-
kindness depending on the type of stressor whereas those low in social anxiety did not differ 
significantly. Individuals high in social anxiety reported lower levels of self-kindness in a time-
limit condition compared to a social judgement condition, which was opposite to our hypotheses. 
Finally, although Study Three did not replicate the interaction effects of social anxiety and 
scenario condition found in Study One, it did provide support for domain-specific self-
compassion, as participants recalling a time when they were physically ill were significantly 
more self-compassionate than those recalling times of social judgement or burnout. Overall, this 
package of studies provides support for the conceptualization of self-compassion by domain of 
stress, and partial support for levels of social anxiety influencing domain-specific self-
compassion.  
 Across these studies, several important findings emerged that have implications for the 
self-compassion literature. First, an individual’s level of self-compassion depends not only on 
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personality variables (social anxiety), but also on the domain of stress. Previous research has 
primarily considered self-compassion to be a trait-like variable (Leary et al, 2007; MacBeth & 
Gumley, 2012; Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007), rather than considering that individuals may 
hold different levels of self-compassion depending on the domain of stress experienced. This 
finding has clinical implications. Current self-compassion and related therapies include 
Compassionate Mind Training (Gilbert & Procter, 2006), the Mindful Self-Compassion Program 
(Neff & Germer, 2013), and Compassion-Focused Therapy (Gilbert, 2009). These therapies 
primarily focus on cognitive reframing and targeting self-criticism to reduce negative symptoms. 
However, new self-compassion practices could utilize the recollection of scenarios in domains 
where individuals are self-compassionate and teach them to extend that self-compassion to 
situations in which they may not be as kind to themselves. Particularly for individuals with social 
anxiety who show less self-compassion in socially evaluative contexts, therapists could teach 
these individuals to think about other hardships or stressful situations in their lives where they 
did show themselves compassion, and extend those feelings to social situations. From this 
research, it appears that individuals high in social anxiety are most self-compassionate when 
recalling a time where they were physically ill. Asking individuals to recall how they treated 
themselves with care and understanding when they were last sick could be an effective way to 
then translate self-compassion to the social judgement domain. Future research could explore 
this translational self-compassion induction in both clinical and non-clinical samples. 
A second finding that has implications for self-compassion research is the differing 
outcomes found across these studies on the three subscales of Neff’s (2003) self-compassion 
scale. In this package of studies, it was found that these subscales do not always display uniform 
results. In Study Two, only the self-kindness subscale differed significantly across both condition 
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and social anxiety level, while the overall state self-compassion scale, and other two subscales 
(common humanity and mindfulness), did not. In Studies One and Three, although the general 
pattern of main effects was consistent across subscales, in comparing the scenario condition 
differences, results differed. In some instances, certain subscales showed those in the physical 
illness condition to be significantly more self-compassionate than the other two conditions, 
whereas other subscales did not. Several other studies utilizing this self-compassion scale have 
also found mixed results across the three subscales (Blackie & Kocovski, 2018; Shin & Lim, 
2018). As previous literature on the cohesiveness or distinctness of these three subscales is 
greatly limited, it is currently unknown whether these facets of self-compassion together 
represent self-compassion, or whether one facet lends itself more to improving the other facets 
(Barnard & Curry, 2011). For example, fostering self-kindness may be critical to improving 
overall self-compassion. Alternatively, increasing one’s mindfulness may be critical for 
improvements in all facets. Although there is work on the factor structure of the scale (as 
reviewed below), research on the impact of one facet on other facets and on overall self-
compassion levels is limited.  
Differential findings across the subscales may be the result of different factors.  First, the 
subscales of the self-compassion scale may not measure the constructs they intend to measure 
with as much accuracy as hoped when the scale was designed. Previous research has critiqued 
the factor structure of the self-compassion scale, which consists of the three facets of self-
compassion (self-kindness, common humanity, mindfulness) and their negative counterparts 
(self-criticism, isolation, over-identification). Factor analyses on the overall self-compassion 
scale have found a lack of evidence for the higher-order factoring that would validate summing 
the six subscale scores into an overall self-compassion score (Hupfeld & Ruffieux, 2011; 
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Petrocchi, Ottaviani, & Couyoumdjian, 2013), or have found only two emerging factors; a 
positive and a negative component (Lopez et al., 2015). Researchers have therefore criticized the 
use of the self-compassion scale as an overall score from the summed subscales. However, a 
recent study by Neff and colleagues (2019) using diverse sampling from 20 separate samples did 
find strong support for the six-factor subscales and using those to make a composite score of 
self-compassion. 
The second reason why the self-compassion subscales may be acting in different ways 
throughout this package of studies is that the subscales themselves influence each other in 
differing ways, and some subscales may be more representative of self-compassion than others. 
A recent study by Dreisoerner, Junker, and van Dick (2020) explored the relationships among the 
self-compassion subscales directly. Using three separate writing interventions, one representing 
each subscale, the authors sought to determine which facet might influence or improve the 
others. Findings indicated that mindfulness was the most influential subscale, improving overall 
self-compassion, self-kindness, and reducing isolation which is the opposite of common 
humanity. The common humanity subscale had influence on overall self-compassion and some 
additional exploratory variables, and the self-kindness subscale was least influential overall. This 
finding is interesting when relating it to the current Study Two, as self-kindness was the only 
subscale in our research to show the hypothesized interaction effect. A related study by Phillips 
(2019) examined the relationship between the self-compassion subscales within different self-
compassion mindsets, and interestingly found that self-kindness and common humanity 
correlated most strongly with an individual’s positive well-being. From the limited research in 
the area of the self-compassion subscales, it is clear that further studies need to be conducted to 
better understand how these subscales come together to create the composite labelled by Neff 
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(2003) as self-compassion. As well, it is important to reconcile these differing results discussed 
above as to which subscales are most influential, both over each other, and for overall self-
compassion. 
It is possible that certain domains of stress may elicit more self-kindness, or more 
mindfulness, or more common humanity than others. The previous, limited, research on the 
subscales of self-compassion does not take the domain of stress into account. For example, stress 
emerging from the loss of a loved one may elicit more common humanity, as individuals gather 
to attend a funeral surrounded by fellow grievers, showing them that they are not alone in their 
suffering. If the subscales of Neff’s (2003) self-compassion scale behave differently across 
different contexts, are these facets then working together to strengthen self-compassion, or are 
they actually working independently to enforce other constructs? As well, future research should 
explore how self-kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness independently relate to different 
domains of stress where self-compassion may be helpful. Perhaps being kind to oneself is 
enough to get an individual through some life stresses, whereas a combination of self-kindness 
and mindfulness, or common humanity and mindfulness, are more helpful in other contexts.  
 Finally, finding that self-compassion differs across domains could be the result of certain 
domains lending themselves more to a self-compassionate mindset than others. From Studies 
One and Three, individuals are most self-compassionate in times when they are sick, regardless 
of personality variables like social anxiety. Self-care and self-kindness have been normalized by 
society in times of illness. We encourage individuals to take time away from work to stay home 
and care for themselves when they are sick, subtly encouraging self-compassion. Even the self-
blame findings from our mediation in Study Three support this idea that when someone is ill, 
they do not feel the same level of guilt and blame for themselves as they would in other instances 
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of hardship like burnout, and this lower level of self-blame leads to more self-compassion. The 
prevalence of previous research on self-compassion in chronic pain and chronic illness literature 
further supports this idea that times of poor physical health may lend themselves more intuitively 
to self-compassion (Terry & Leary, 2011; Wren et al., 2012; Sirois, Molnar, & Hirsch, 2015). 
However, this is not the societal norm in other domains of stress and hardship. When one is 
feeling burnt out, or down about their performance after delivering a speech, they are not 
encouraged to take time for themselves, to practice self-care, or to not be so hard on themselves. 
Perhaps if self-compassion was promoted and accepted more openly in these other domains of 
stress, we would not see these domain-specific differences that our package of studies displays. 
As a whole, society needs to work to promote self-compassion across all areas of life. It is 
interesting that our exploration of burnout displays low levels of self-compassion across 
individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety. There is very little research examining the 
relationship between burnout and self-compassion outside of the realm of compassion fatigue in 
medical and mental health professionals (Beaumont, Durkin, Martin, & Carson, 2015; Montero-
Marin et al., 2016). Future research should explore why self-compassion is so low for those 
experiencing burnout, and whether inducing self-compassion through written or other inductions, 
would be effective in alleviating these negativities around burnout.  
 Some limitations of the present set of studies include a lack of generalizability from the 
samples utilized, and the non-clinical classifications used for distinguishing those high versus 
low in social anxiety. All three studies in this package relied on a sample of undergraduate 
students, which limits our sample to mainly female, white, young adults. Future research could 
expand these studies to other populations with differing demographics to see how generalizable 
these results are. As well, this sample did not specifically target individuals diagnosed with 
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social anxiety disorder. Future research should attempt to replicate these studies with a clinical 
sample. Another limitation to this research is that the primary dependent measure of state self-
compassion was adapted from the original self-compassion scale (Neff, 2003). This measure has 
not been previously validated. Although the Cronbach alphas were relatively high across all three 
studies (α>.90), some items may not have been as relevant or face valid as others throughout the 
different study conditions. Future research should explore the creation of a state version of 
Neff’s self-compassion scale and further evaluate its psychometric properties. Other directions 
for future research include examining a domain-specific self-compassion induction, which would 
teach individuals with a self-compassion deficit in one area of their life to pull from other 
stressful experiences in which they were self-compassionate to increase self-compassion in the 
area of deficit. As well, researchers should explore other domains of stress to extend the present 
package findings to areas beyond burnout, physical illness, and social stress. Finally, a deeper 
exploration of the deficit in self-compassion that those who are burnt out display would be an 
exciting and relatively unexplored avenue for future research.  
 In conclusion, the present package of studies displays strong support for the 
conceptualization of domain-specific self-compassion. Individuals were shown to differ in their 
levels of self-compassion based on the type of stress they faced or recounted. The existing 
literature on self-compassion has not taken into account the potential importance of context, and 
future research should continue to examine how the domain of stress could influence one’s level 
of self-compassion. Furthermore, our research provides partial support for the idea that 
individuals with social anxiety may display lower levels of self-compassion in social contexts 
than in other domains of stress. Clinicians should continue to examine ways to effectively inspire 
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self-compassion in individuals with social anxiety within these social contexts so that they, too, 
can experience the psychological benefits of self-compassion. 
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Appendix A 
Study One Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions listed below by writing your response or checking the most 
appropriate answer. 
 
1. What is your age? ______  
 
2. With which gender do you most closely identify? 
 
Male   □ 
Female  □ 
Other  □ 
 
3. With which ethnicity do you most closely identify? 
 
White/Caucasian   □ 
Asian      □ 
Black/African Canadian   □ 
Middle Eastern/West Asian  □ 
First Nations    □ 
Other      □ Please specify _________________________ 
 
 
4. What is your marital status? 
 
Married       □    Separated    □    Divorced          □  
 
Cohabitating □    Single    □    In a Relationship  □ 
SPIN 
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Please indicate how much the following problems have bothered you during the past week. Circle only 
one box for each problem, and please be sure to answer all items. 
 
Statement 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat Very 
much 
Extremely 
1. I am afraid of people in authority. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. I am bothered by blushing in front 
of people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. Parties and social events scare me. 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I avoid talking to people I don't 
know. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. Being criticized scares me a lot. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. Fear of embarrassment causes me 
to avoid doing things or speaking 
to people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. Sweating in front of people causes 
me distress. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I avoid going to parties.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I avoid activities in which I am the 
centre of attention. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. Talking to strangers scares me. 
  
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I avoid having to give speeches.  
  
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I would do anything to avoid being 
criticized. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. Heart palpitations bother me when 
I am around people. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I am afraid of doing things when 
people might be watching. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. Being embarrassed or looking 
stupid are among my worst fears. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I avoid speaking to anyone in 
authority. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. Trembling or shaking in front of 
others is distressing to me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
 113 
SIAS 
Please indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is characteristic or true for you. 
 
Characteristic Not at all  Slightly  Moderately  Very    Extremely  
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with someone 
in authority (teacher, boss). 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I have difficulty making eye contact with 
others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about myself 
or my feelings. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the 
people I work with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I find it easy to make friends my own age. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance on the 
street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I 
appear awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s 
point of view. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I have difficulty talking to people I’m 
attracted to. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I find myself worrying I won’t know what to 
say in social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I don’t 
know well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when 
talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself 
worrying I will be ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet someone I 
know only slightly. 
0 1 2 3 4 
  
 114 
SCS 
 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Indicate how often you behave in the state 
manner using the 1-5 scale.  
 
 
Statement 
Almost 
Never 
   Almost 
Always 
1. I’m disapproving and judgemental 
about my own flaws and inadequacies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. When I’m feeling down I tend to 
obsess and fixate on everything that’s 
wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. When things are going badly for me, I 
see the difficulties as part of life that 
everyone goes through.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. When I think about my inadequacies, it 
tends to make me feel more separate 
and cut off from the rest of the world.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I try to be loving towards myself when 
I’m feeling emotional pain. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I fail at something important to 
me I become consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy.   
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When I’m down and out, I remind 
myself that there are lots of other 
people in the world feeling like I am.   
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When times are really difficult, I tend 
to be tough on myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. When something upsets me I try to 
keep my emotions in balance.   
1 2 3 4 5 
10. When I feel inadequate in some way, I 
try to remind myself that feelings of 
inadequacy are shared by most people.   
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I’m intolerant and impatient towards 
those aspects of my personality I don’t 
like. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. When I am going through a very hard 
time, I give myself the caring and 
tenderness I need.  
1 2 3 4 5 
13. When I’m feeling down, I tend to feel 
like most other people are probably 
happier than I am.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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14. When something painful happens I try 
to take a balanced view of the 
situation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I try to see my failings as part of the 
human condition.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. When I see aspects of myself that I 
don’t like, I get down on myself.   
1 2 3 4 5 
17. When I fail at something important to 
me I try to keep things in perspective.   
1 2 3 4 5 
18. When I’m really struggling, I tend to 
feel like other people must be having 
an easier time of it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I’m kind to myself when I’m 
experiencing suffering.  
1 2 3 4 5 
20. When something upsets me I get 
carried away with my feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I can be a bit cold-hearted towards 
myself when I’m experiencing 
suffering. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. When I’m feeling down I try to 
approach my feelings with curiosity 
and openness.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I’m tolerant of my own flaws and 
inadequacies.   
1 2 3 4 5 
24. When something painful happens I 
tend to blow the incident out of 
proportion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. When I fail at something that’s 
important to me, I tend to feel alone in 
my failure.   
1 2 3 4 5 
26. I try to be understanding and patient 
towards those aspects of my 
personality I don’t like.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Single Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which the following item applies to you. 
 
 
 
Item 
Not very 
true of  
me 
     Very true 
of me 
I have high self-esteem 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
During the past week, I felt depressed. 
0   1   2   3 
Rarely  sometimes  occasionally  most of the time 
 
 
 
SUDS 
Please record your level of distress at this moment. 
 
Level of distress from 0 – 100 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
Guideline for anxiety rating: 
 
0 |-------------------- 25 ---------------------- 50 -------------------- 75 -----------------------| 100 
No distress            Mild distress                Moderate      Significant            Highest Possible 
         distress         distress       distress 
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Writing Task Condition One (Social Judgement Threat) 
Please spend five minutes on the following exercise. If you finish the exercise before the five minutes 
has passed, please review your answers. 
 
Please bring to mind a social experience in which you felt you were being judged (for example talking to 
a group of people you do not know well, giving a presentation, walking through a crowded area).  Please 
be sure to select a situation that is meaningful or important to you.  
 
Describe the situation that you brought to mind.  
 
 
Where were you? 
 
 
 
When did it occur? 
 
 
 
Who were you with? 
 
 
What was your relationship with the person/people whom you felt were judging you? 
 
 
 
What were you worried about? (i.e. what did you feel you were being judge about/why do you feel you 
were being judged?)  
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Writing Task Condition Two (Physical Illness) 
Please spend five minutes on the following exercise. If you finish the exercise before the five minutes 
has passed, please review your answers. 
 
Please bring to mind a time where you felt physically ill (for example, having the flu or catching a cold).  
Please be sure to select a situation that is meaningful or important for you.  
 
Describe the illness you had.  
 
 
Where were you? 
 
 
 
When did it occur? 
 
 
 
Why do you think you got sick? 
 
 
How did you feel, both physically and emotionally? 
 
 
 
What were you worried about? (i.e. never getting better, illness progressing, etc.)  
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Writing Task Condition Three (Work Burn Out Scenario) 
Please spend five minutes on the following exercise. If you finish the exercise before the five minutes 
has passed, please review your answers. 
 
Please bring to mind a time where you felt burnt out or stressed because of work or school (for 
example, too many assignments due or having to work long and late-night shifts).  Please be sure to 
select a situation that is meaningful or important for you.  
 
Describe the situation that you brought to mind.  
 
 
Where were you? 
 
 
 
When did it occur? 
 
 
 
Who were you with? 
 
 
Why did you experience this burnout? 
 
 
 
What were you worried about? (i.e. not finishing assignments on time, losing control at work, etc.)  
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Questionnaire on Recalled Situation 
 
Please answer the following questions in relation to the previous situation you recalled. 
 
 
Item 
Not at 
all 
Somewhat Moderately Very 
Much 
Extremely 
1. How well were you able to 
remember the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. How well were you able to 
remember the thoughts 
you had following the 
situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. How anxious were you 
during the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Did you feel like you had 
control over the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How important was the 
situation to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SUDS 
Please record your level of distress at this moment,  
while thinking about the previous experience you described. 
 
Level of distress from 0 – 100 
 
_________________________ 
 
Guideline for anxiety rating: 
 
0 |-------------------- 25 ---------------------- 50 -------------------- 75 -----------------------| 100 
No distress            Mild distress                Moderate      Significant            Highest Possible 
         distress         distress       distress 
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State Self-Compassion 
 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Indicate how often you behaved in the stated 
manner with regards to the situation that you brought to mind. 
 
 
Statement 
Almost 
Never 
   Almost 
Always 
1. When I thought about my experience I 
became consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I obsessed and fixated on everything 
that was wrong in the situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I understood that it is something that 
many people go through.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I felt separate and cut off the rest of 
the world.   
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I tried to be loving towards myself. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I became consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I reminded myself that there are lots of 
other people in the world who have 
felt this way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I was tough on myself.  1 2 3 4 5 
9. I tried to keep my emotions in balance.  1 2 3 4 5 
10. I tried to remind myself that feelings of 
inadequacy are shared by most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I was disapproving and judgmental 
about my experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I gave myself the caring and 
tenderness I needed.  
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I felt like most other people are 
probably happier than I am.  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I tried to take a balanced view of the 
situation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I tried to see my failings in this 
experience as part of the human 
condition.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I got down on myself.   1 2 3 4 5 
17. I tried to keep things in perspective.   1 2 3 4 5 
18. I felt like other people would have an 
easier time with it.   
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I was kind to myself.  1 2 3 4 5 
20. I got carried away with my feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 
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21. I was a bit cold-hearted towards 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I tried to approach my feelings with 
curiosity and openness.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I was tolerant of my own flaws and 
inadequacies.  
1 2 3 4 5 
24. I blew it out of proportion.  1 2 3 4 5 
25. I felt alone.  1 2 3 4 5 
26. I tried to be understanding and patient 
towards those aspects of my 
personality I don’t like.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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State Anxiety 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Version (STAI-S) 
 
Please respond to the following characteristics with regards to the situation that you brought to mind. 
 
Characteristic 
Not at 
all  
Somew
hat  
Moderatel
y So  
Very 
Much 
So 
1. I felt calm 1 2 3 4 
2. I felt secure 1 2 3 4 
3. I was tense 1 2 3 4 
4. I felt strained 1 2 3 4 
5. I felt at ease 1 2 3 4 
6. I felt upset 1 2 3 4 
7. I worried over possible misfortunes 1 2 3 4 
8. I felt satisfied 1 2 3 4 
9. I felt frightened 1 2 3 4 
10. I felt comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11. I felt self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12. I felt nervous 1 2 3 4 
13. I was jittery 1 2 3 4 
14. I felt indecisive 1 2 3 4 
15. I was relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16. I felt content 1 2 3 4 
17. I was worried 1 2 3 4 
18. I felt confused 1 2 3 4 
19. I felt steady 1 2 3 4 
20. I felt pleasant 1 2 3 4 
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PEPI-S 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling the 
numbers that correspond with your answer choices.  
  
Item Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I thought about the mistakes I made 
during the event. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. After the event, I kept replaying the 
situation over in my mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I generally focused on the negative aspects 
of the event after it occurred. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I thought about how poorly the situation 
went.   
1 2 3 4 5 
5. After the event, I thought about other 
similar past situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I found it difficult to forget about the 
event after it was over. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I experienced recurring thoughts about the 
event long after it was over. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. My thoughts about the event interfered 
with my ability to concentrate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. After the event was over, I experienced 
distressing thoughts about the situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. After the situation was over, I became 
overwhelmed by my thoughts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I experienced intrusive thoughts about the 
event. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. When thinking about the event, I became 
preoccupied by my thoughts 
1 2 3 4 5 
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PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item 
and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. 
Please indicate the extent to which you feel this way right now, in this moment. 
 Very 
slightly/ 
Not at all 
 
A Little 
 
Moderately 
 
Quite a 
bit 
 
Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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Suspicion Probe: 
When conducting research, we rely on participants' responses being honest and accurate in order for us 
to draw valid conclusions from the data. However, we recognize that there are many reasons 
participants might be unable or unwilling to provide fully honest and accurate responses. In these cases 
it is truly helpful for us to be able to identify responses that may not be valid so we can take this into 
account. 
In your honest opinion, should we use your data from this survey?  
Please note: your answer is confidential, and you will be compensated whichever answer you choose. 
o Yes 
o No  
If no, please indicate why you think we should not use your data from this survey. 
 
 
 
Mood Booster 
Please take a few minutes to write down three positive things about yourself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix B 
Study Two Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
SCS-SF-T 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Indicate how often you behave in the 
stated manner, on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). 
Statement Almost 
Never 
   Almost 
Always 
1. When I fail at something 
important to me I become 
consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I try to be understanding and 
patient towards those aspects of my 
personality I don’t like. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. When something painful 
happens I try to take a balanced 
view of the situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. When I’m feeling down, I tend to 
feel like most other people are 
probably happier than I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I try to see my failings as part of the 
human condition. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I’m going through a very hard 
time, I give myself the caring and 
tenderness I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When something upsets me I try to 
keep my emotions in balance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When I fail at something that’s 
important to me, I tend to feel alone 
in my failure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. When I’m feeling down I tend to 
obsess and fixate on everything that’s 
wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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10. When I feel inadequate in some 
way, I try to remind myself that 
feelings of inadequacy are shared by 
most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I’m disapproving and judgmental 
about my own flaws and 
inadequacies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I’m intolerant and impatient 
towards those aspects of my 
personality I don’t like. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SSC-S 
Please read each statement carefully before answering. Indicate how often you behave in 
the stated manner. 
Statement Almost 
Never 
   Almost 
Always 
1. When I fail to do the right thing 
in a social situation, I become 
consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I try to be understanding and 
patient towards myself when I fall 
short of my social expectations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. When I make a mistake in 
public, I try to take a balanced view 
of the situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. When I’m feeling anxious in a 
social setting, I feel like other 
people are probably more relaxed 
than I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I try to see my failings in social 
situations as part of the human 
condition. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6. When I’m having a hard time in 
social situations, I give myself the 
caring and tenderness I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When something upsets me in 
social situations, I try to keep my 
emotions in balance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. When I fail to do the right thing 
in a social situation, I tend to feel 
alone in my failure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. When I’m feeling socially 
anxious, I tend to obsess and fixate 
on everything that’s wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. When I am feeling socially 
inadequate, I try to remind myself 
that feelings of inadequacy are 
shared by most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I am disapproving and 
judgemental about my own social 
flaws and inadequacies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I am intolerant and impatient 
towards myself when socially 
anxious. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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ACQ 
Listed below are a number of statements describing a set of beliefs. Please read each statement carefully 
and, on the 0-5 scale below, indicate how much you think each statement is typical of you. 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I am usually able to 
avoid threat quite 
easily. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
2. How well I cope 
with difficult situations 
depends on whether I 
have outside help. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
3. When I am put under 
stress, I am likely to 
lose control. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I can usually stop 
my anxiety from 
showing. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
5. When I am 
frightened by 
something, there is 
generally nothing I can 
do. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
6. My emotions seem 
to have a life of their 
own. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
7. There is little I can 
do to influence 
people’s judgments of 
me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Whether I can 
successfully escape a 
frightening situation is 
always a matter of 
chance with me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I often shake 
uncontrollably. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 131 
10. I can usually put 
worrisome thoughts out 
of my mind easily 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When I am in a 
stressful situation, I am 
able to stop myself from 
breathing too hard. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
       
12. I can usually 
influence the degree to 
which a situation is 
potentially threatening to 
me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I am able to control 
my level of anxiety. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
14. There is little I can do 
to change frightening 
events. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
15. The extent to which a 
difficult situation 
resolves itself has 
nothing to do with my 
actions. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
16. If something is going 
to hurt me, it will happen 
no matter what I do. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I can usually relax 
when I want 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
18. When I am under 
stress, I am not always 
sure how I will react. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I can usually make 
sure people like me if I 
work at it. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Most events that 
make me anxious are 
outside my control. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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21. I always know 
exactly how I will react 
to difficult situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
22. I am unconcerned if I 
become anxious in a 
difficult situation, 
because I am confident in 
my ability to cope with 
my symptoms 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
23. What people think of 
me is largely outside of 
my control. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
24. I usually find it hard 
to deal with difficult 
problems. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
25. When I hear someone 
has a serious illness, I 
worry that I am next. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
26. When I am anxious, I 
find it hard to focus on 
anything other than my 
anxiety. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I am able to cope as 
effectively with 
unexpected anxiety as I 
am with anxiety I expect 
to occur. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
28. I sometimes think, 
“Why even bother to try 
coping with my anxiety 
when nothing I do seems 
to affect how frequently 
or intensely I experience 
it?” 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
29. I often have the 
ability to get along with 
“difficult” people. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
30. I will avoid conflict 
due to my inability to 
successfully resolve it. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Single Item Self-Esteem (SISE) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Single Depression Item (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
STOP 
Please notify the researcher that you have reached this 
page, so that you can move on to the second part of 
this study. 
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Anagram Task (social judgement condition instructions) 
Listed below are 24 anagrams. Each anagram is a word mixed in a scrambled order. Please try 
to unscramble the anagrams and identify the words. The first anagram is solved as an example. 
Upon completion, please put the ID from the cover sheet of your booklet on the top of your 
page, tear it from you booklet and give it to the researcher for scoring. Scores will be 
announced to the group once everyone is finished. 
 
1. eses  _________sees_______  13. ricedinto ____________________ 
1. imcus  ____________________ 14. croptuome ____________________ 
2. gorean  ____________________ 15. antirss ____________________ 
3. cloosh  ____________________ 16. atyss ____________________ 
4. moro  ____________________ 17. yuikrto ____________________ 
5. ganlueag ____________________ 18. eremot ____________________ 
6. hoteelpen ____________________ 19. lapep ____________________ 
7. soemu  ____________________ 20. nogear ____________________  
8. roleevat ____________________ 21. ensbusis ____________________ 
9. nautmu  ____________________ 22. tabmoroh ____________________ 
10. aequtom ____________________ 23. issneruvtv ____________________ 
11. woleyl  ____________________ 24. peash ____________________  
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Anagram Task  
Listed below are 24 anagrams. Each anagram is a word mixed in a scrambled order. Please try 
to unscramble the anagrams and identify the word in the 7 minutes allotted for this activity. The 
first anagram is solved as an example. 
 
1. eses  _________sees______ _ 13. ricedinto ____________________ 
2. imcus  ____________________ 14. croptuome ____________________ 
3. gorean  ____________________ 15. antirss ____________________ 
4. cloosh  ____________________ 16. atyss ____________________ 
5. moro  ____________________ 17. yuikrto ____________________ 
6. ganlueag ____________________ 18. eremot ____________________ 
7. hoteelpen ____________________ 19. lapep ____________________ 
8. soemu  ____________________ 20. nogear ____________________  
9. roleevat  ____________________ 21. ensbusis ____________________ 
10. nautmu ____________________ 22. tabmoroh ____________________ 
11. aequtom ____________________ 23. issneruvtv ____________________ 
12. woleyl  ____________________ 24. peash ____________________ 
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Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Self-Compassion Scale-State (SCS-S) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
 
POC 
Please answer the following questions focusing on your experience with the word jumbles you 
completed. 
Statement Not At 
All 
   Very 
Much 
1. How much did you feel that the outcome 
of the task was beyond your control? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. How much did you feel that the task was 
something you could change or do 
something about? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. How much did you feel that you had to 
accept the situation as there was nothing 
you could do to change it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. How much did you feel that you could 
take steps to resolve the task? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How much did you feel that the outcome 
of the task would be influenced by factors 
external (e.g., chance) to yourself? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. How much did you feel that your 
abilities would influence the outcome of 
the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
MC 
Item Not at 
all 
 Somewhat  Very 
much 
1. During the word jumbles, to what 
extent did you feel social pressure 
from the researcher? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. During the word jumbles, to what 
extent did you feel social pressure 
from people other than the 
researcher? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. During the word jumbles, to what 
extent did you feel pressure from the 
time-limit? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. To what extent did you feel 
responsible for the outcome of the 
word jumbles? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. To what extent did you feel judged 
by the researcher in this study? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. To what extent did you feel judged 
by people other than the researcher in 
this study? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Questions about the Researcher 
 
Item Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. The researcher was 
friendly 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The researcher seemed 
to like me 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The researcher was 
cold/aloof 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I felt comfortable with 
the researcher 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Suspicion Probe: 
When conducting research, we rely on participants' responses being honest and accurate in 
order for us to draw valid conclusions from the data. However, we recognize that there are many 
reasons participants might be unable or unwilling to provide fully honest and accurate responses. 
In these cases it is truly helpful for us to be able to identify responses that may not be valid so we 
can take this into account. 
In your honest opinion, should we use your data from this survey?  
Please note: your answer is confidential, and you will be compensated whichever answer you 
choose. 
Yes 
No  
If no, please indicate why you think we should not use your data from this survey. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you have any suspicions about what the purpose of this study is? 
Yes 
No  
If yes, please indicate what you suspect this study’s purpose to be. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Believability: 
Throughout the study, there were several instances where the research instructor used deception 
in order to hide the true purpose of the study. Overall, how believable did you find the study 
before we just told you about these deceptions? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all believable   Neutral/No opinion  Extremely believable 
If you had any doubts about the study, what were they? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Mood Booster 
Please take a few minutes to write down three positive things about yourself. 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix C 
Study Three Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Self-Compassion Scale-Trait (SCS-T) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
General Self-Efficacy  
Please read each of the following statements and indicate to what degree each statement is 
typically true of your everyday behaviour. 
Item Not at all 
true 
Hardly 
true 
Moderately 
true 
Exactly 
true 
1. I can always manage to solve difficult 
problems if I try hard enough. 
    
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means 
and ways to get what I want. 
    
3. it is easy for me to stick to my aims and 
accomplish my goals. 
    
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently 
with unexpected events. 
    
5. thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to 
handle unforeseen situations. 
    
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the 
necessary effort. 
    
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties 
because I can rely on my coping abilities. 
\    
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can 
usually find several solutions. 
    
9. if I am in trouble, I can usually think of a 
solution. 
    
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my 
way. 
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Locus of Control  
Please read the following statements and indicate whether each statement is typically true of you 
or not. 
Item True of me Not true of me 
1. I usually get what I want in 
life. 
  
2. I need to be kept informed 
about news events. 
  
3. I never know where I stand 
with other people. 
  
4. I do not really believe in 
luck or chance. 
  
5. I think that I could easily 
win the lottery. 
  
6. If I do not succeed on a 
task, I tend to give up. 
  
7. I usually convince others to 
do things my way. 
  
8. People make a difference 
in controlling crime. 
  
9. The success I have is 
largely a matter of chance. 
  
10. Marriage is largely a 
gamble for most people. 
  
11. People must be the master 
of their own fate. 
  
12. It is not important for me 
to vote. 
  
13. My life seems like a 
series of random events. 
  
14. I never try anything that I 
am not sure of. 
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15. I earn the respect and 
honours I receive. 
  
16. A person can get rich by 
taking risks. 
  
17. Leaders are successful 
when they work hard. 
  
18. Persistence and hard work 
usually lead to success. 
  
19. It is difficult to know who 
my real friends are. 
  
20. Other people usually 
control my life. 
  
Single Item Self-Esteem (SISE) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Single Depression Item (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Writing Task – Scenario Conditions (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Recalling Scenarios Questionnaire (see Appendix A - Study One Measures, plus addition item 
listed below) 
How long ago did the event that you described occur?  
 
Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Self-Compassion Scale-State (SCS-S) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
 
Causal Dimension Scale II 
 
The items below concern your impressions or opinions of the cause or causes for the scenario 
you recalled and described. Circle one number for each of the following questions.  
Is this cause(s) something:  
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1. That reflects an aspect of yourself 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 reflects an aspect of the situation  
2. Manageable by you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 not manageable by you  
3. Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 temporary 
4. You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 you cannot regulate  
5. Over which others have control 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 over which others have no control  
6. Onside of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 outside of you  
7. Stable over time 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 variable over time  
8. Under the power of other people 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 not under the power of other people  
9. Something about you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 something about others  
10. Over which you have power 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 over which you have no power  
11. Unchangeable 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 changeable  
12. Other people can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 other people cannot regulate  
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POC 
 
Please answer the following questions focusing on the scenario you just recalled and described. 
Statement Not At 
All 
   Very 
Much 
1. How much did you feel that the outcome 
of the situation was beyond your control? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. How much did you feel that the situation 
was something you could change or do 
something about? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. How much did you feel that you had to 
accept the situation as there was nothing 
you could do to change it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. How much did you feel that you could 
take steps to resolve the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How much did you feel that the outcome 
of the situation would be influenced by 
factors external (e.g., chance) to yourself? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. How much did you feel that your 
abilities would influence the outcome of 
the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
Felt Responsibility/Self-Blame 
Please answer the following questions based on the scenario you just recalled and described. 
Item Not at all    Very 
much 
1. To what extent did this situation 
happen because of the kind of person 
you are? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. To what extent did this situation 
happen because of something you did or 
did not do?  
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. How much do you think you 
deserved what happened to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. How likely is it that something like 
this will happen to you again because of 
your personal characteristics? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How likely is it that something like 
this will happen to you again because of 
your behaviour? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. How responsible do you feel for the 
outcome of the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-State (STAI-S) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Post-Event Processing Inventory-State (PEPI-S) (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
Suspicion Probe (see Appendix A - Study One Measures) 
 
